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REVIVING CRIMINAL EQUITY
Cortney E. Lollar*
Recent scholarship has begun to take note of a resurgence of equity in civil cases. Due to a long-accepted
premise that equity does not apply in criminal cases, no one has examined whether this quiet revival is
occurring in criminal jurisprudence as well. After undertaking such an investigation, this Article uncovers
the remarkable discovery that equitable remedies, including injunctions and specific performance, are
experiencing a resurgence in both federal and state criminal jurisprudence. Courts have granted equitable
relief in a range of scenarios, providing reprieve from unconstitutional bail and probation practices and
allowing for an appropriate remedy to ineffective assistance of counsel during the plea-bargaining process.
In this regard, equity operates as moral philosophers and early legal scholars envisioned it might: as a
corrective to law. Moral philosophers contemplated equity as a complement to the rule of law and legal
justice. Equity was to step in when a strict application of the law rendered an unjust result. After the
supposed merger of law and equity in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, scholars and jurists believed
equity had been subsumed under legal processes and structures. This assumption of fusion remained the
dominant narrative until recently, when scholars began to note equity’s resurgence in civil cases. This
Article contributes to the literature challenging this presumption of equity’s demise. Shifting the lens
toward criminal cases, this Article illuminates that equitable remedies are experiencing a similar resurgence in the criminal sphere. A review of the case law confirms that parties in criminal cases are seeking
equitable relief with increasing regularity, and courts are often granting such relief. This Article sets the
stage for a more robust conversation about what the balance between equity and law is—and what it
should be—in the context of our deeply troubled criminal legal system.

INTRODUCTION
On August 27, 2017, thirty-five-year-old Bradley Hester was arrested in
Cullman, Alabama, for possession of drug paraphernalia, a misdemeanor.1 He
was taken to the Cullman County jail and told that he would be released if he
paid a $1000 bond. He could not pay that bond. He finally “appeared” in court
for the first time a day or two later, via a video link from the jail. He was unrepresented by counsel, and the hearing lasted less than two minutes. The magistrate judge informed him of his charges and set bond at $1000, never inquiring
as to Hester’s ability to pay. The judge asked Hester no questions and gave him

* James & Mary Lassiter Associate Professor, University of Kentucky College of Law. Thank you to
Charlie Amiot, Leigh Anenson, Richard Ausness, Joshua Barnette, Scott Bauries, Christopher Bradley, Zachary Bray, Joshua Douglas, Brian Frye, Michael Healy, Andy Hessick, Jennifer Laurin, Donald J. Lollar, Justin
Murray, Kathy Moore, Michael Morley, Melynda Price, Chris Roederer, Alice Ristroph, Jenny Roberts, Caprice Roberts, Paul Salamanca, Saurabh Vishnubhakat, Ramsi Woodcock, and participants in the Southeastern Association of Law Schools Remedies Discussion forum, Criminal Justice Ethics Schmooze, CrimFest
2018, and the University of Kentucky faculty brown bag series for their invaluable feedback. I also extend
my gratitude to Mazie Bryant and the editors of the Alabama Law Review for their excellent editorial assistance.
1. The facts in these two paragraphs all come from Hester’s complaint. Intervenor Complaint at 2, 8–
9, 21, Schultz v. State, 330 F. Supp. 3d 1344 (N.D. Ala. 2018) (No. 5:17-cv-00270-MHH).
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no information about when his next court date might be. As a result, the judge
never learned that Hester could not afford his bond. He had worked odd jobs
during the prior two years but had no steady income, no assets, and no real
property. The magistrate told him he could apply for an attorney, but a jail official told him he did not need one, since he was only charged with a misdemeanor.
Hester was still sitting in jail on March 9, 2018, solely because he could not
pay the $1000 bond. And he still did not know when his next court date would
be. Lawyers acting on his behalf filed a request for a civil injunction to prevent
the sheriff’s office from prospectively jailing Hester and other arrestees due to
their inability to pay the amount of bail set by a bail schedule without holding a
prompt individualized hearing to determine the arrestee’s ability to pay and
whether alternate conditions of release might be available. Six months later, a
federal district court issued a preliminary injunction in Hester’s case, finding
that he was substantially likely to prevail on his claim of wealth-based discrimination in Cullman County’s bail practices.2
Attorneys are increasingly utilizing equitable remedies like injunctions to
challenge various troubling criminal legal practices. A federal court in Massachusetts granted William Merlino’s motion to vacate his conviction after his
attorney failed to convey a plea offer to him prior to trial; the court ordered
specific performance of that plea offer.3 Plaintiffs in Alabama brought a state
lawsuit seeking injunctive relief to prevent sheriffs who were running local jails
from pocketing as personal income the money designated for providing food
to inmates.4 Some of these equitable remedies have seen more success than
others. But even when a state or federal court denies the requested equitable
relief, the court is almost always contemplating equity’s application to the specific facts of a particular criminal case.5
This slow-burning revival of equity is not unique to the criminal sphere.
Equitable remedies have seen a recent resurgence in the Supreme Court’s civil
jurisprudence as well, despite the generally accepted wisdom that the legislature
and courts have rejected a distinction between legal and equitable remedies.6 In
recent years, the Supreme Court has increasingly looked to equity in the context

2. Schultz, 330 F. Supp. 3d at 1361.
3. United States v. Merlino, 109 F. Supp. 3d 368, 377 (D. Mass. 2015).
4. Complaint, S. Ctr. For Human Rights v. Ellis, No. CV-2018-900001.00 (Cir. Ct. of Hale Cty., Ala.
Aug. 3, 2018) (Alacourt), https://www.schr.org/files/post/files/HaleCountyAL.PDF.
5. The context in which courts are considering equitable remedies remains separate from the merits
of the charged crime. Rather, courts use equitable remedies to address issues stemming from and collateral
to the criminal charges.
6. See IRIT SAMET, EQUITY: CONSCIENCE GOES TO MARKET 5 (2018); Samuel L. Bray, The Supreme
Court and the New Equity, 68 VAND. L. REV. 997, 999–1000 (2015); Mark P. Gergen et al., The Supreme Court’s
Accidental Revolution? The Test for Permanent Injunctions, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 203, 204 (2012).
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of civil cases to help resolve disputes.7 For example, the Court issued an opinion
in Kansas v. Nebraska regarding the allocation of water resources between the
two states.8 In what many remedies scholars viewed as a significant and unpredicted remedial move, the Court went beyond ordering compensatory damages
and required Nebraska to pay a $1.8 million disgorgement award to Kansas for
the breach in their agreement.9 Thus, rather than rejecting the distinction between legal and equitable remedies, the Court’s jurisprudence leading up to Kansas v. Nebraska “repeatedly underscored the distinction between legal and equitable remedies.”10 As Professor Samuel Bray has noted, “the Court has been
slowly, perhaps even accidentally, laying the foundation for a very different future for the law of remedies” than predicted by scholarship or overtly recognized by the Court.11
Left largely unexplored is whether this resurgence in equitable remedies can
also be observed in criminal jurisprudence. In fact, relatively little has been written on the role of equity in criminal jurisprudence.12 This lack of attention to
the role of equity in criminal cases is unsurprising. Early in the twentieth century, when courts of equity and law remained separate, equity courts regularly
disclaimed any role in criminal cases.13 Eventually, courts allowed for the occasional exception in circumstances when property or “personal liberties” were at
7. See, e.g., Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S.A. v. All. Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308, 318–19 (1999);
U.S. Airways, Inc. v. McCutchen, 569 U.S. 88, 94–101 (2013); see also Bray, supra note 6, at 999–1000; cf.
Caprice L. Roberts, Supreme Disgorgement, 68 FLA. L. REV. 1413, 1415–20 (2016).
8. 135 S. Ct. 1042, 1048–49 (2015). According to remedies scholar Caprice Roberts, this ruling provided a “bold, powerful remedy” that amounted to a “novel expansion of American contract law.” Roberts,
supra note 7, at 1415.
9. Kansas, 135 S. Ct. at 1059, 1064. See generally Roberts, supra note 7. Some scholars have questioned
the use of the equitable move in this case. See, e.g., Theodore E. Yale, A Recipe for Breach: Kansas v. Nebraska’s
Unclear Equity Standards Will Breed Interstate Water Litigation, 20 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 53 (2016). Others
have noted that it is unclear how the special master reached the $1.8 million disgorgement amount. See, e.g.,
Amelia I.P. Frenkel, Interstate Water Rights: Take No Drop for Granted, 40 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 253, 273, 278–
79 (2016). These scholars draw attention to the potentially odd and problematic ways that special masters
work in original jurisdiction cases, particularly in the context of water law, thereby raising the question of
whether this equitable move by the court in Kansas v. Nebraska is anomalous. See Vanessa Casado Pérez,
Specialization Trend: Water Courts, 49 ENVTL. L. 587, 609–10 (2019). See generally L. Elizabeth Sarine, Note, The
Supreme Court’s Problematic Deference to Special Masters in Interstate Water Disputes, 39 ECOLOGY L.Q. 535 (2012).
10. Bray, supra note 6, at 999–1000.
11. Id. at 999.
12. See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, Recharging the Jury: The Criminal Jury’s Constitutional Role in an Era of Mandatory Sentencing, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 33, 59–84 (2003); Josh Bowers, Legal Guilt, Normative Innocence, and the
Equitable Decision Not to Prosecute, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1655 (2010); Shon Hopwood, Clarity in Criminal Law,
54 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 695 (2017) (discussing history of rule of lenity in criminal jurisprudence and advocating
for more use of this equitable relief); Andrea Roth, Trial by Machine, 104 GEO. L.J. 1245, 1285–90 (2016); Fred
O. Smith, Jr., Abstention in the Time of Ferguson, 131 HARV. L. REV. 2283 (2018); cf. Cortney E. Lollar, What Is
Criminal Restitution?, 100 IOWA L. REV. 93 (2014).
13. E.g., In re Sawyer, 124 U.S. 200, 210 (1888); see Comment, Federal Injunctions and State Enforcement of
Invalid Criminal Statutes, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 647, 649 (1965); F.W. Maitland, Injunctions, in EQUITY: ALSO
THE FORMS OF ACTION AT COMMON LAW 254, 260 (A.H. Chaytor & W.J. Whittaker eds., 1910) (“[T]he
Chancery having no jurisdiction in criminal matters steered very clear of the field of crime—there was to be
no criminal equity.”).
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issue,14 but these circumstances were few and far between. Most criminal lawrelated issues were referred to courts of law. If there was an adequate remedy
at law, a petitioner could not seek relief from a court of equity.15 Upon the
merger of law and equity in the 1930s through the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the relationship of equity to criminal law appears to have no longer
generated much interest, in practice or scholarship.
Despite the historically rare application of equity to criminal proceedings,
both state and federal courts have begun to entertain equitable remedies in the
context of criminal cases in recent years. To date, this remarkable trend remains
unexamined.16 This Article aims to fill that gap. This Article examines recent
state and federal criminal jurisprudence and draws out the important shift toward consideration of equitable remedies in the context of various issues that
arise in criminal cases.17
Before turning to examine these cases, however, this Article begins with a
discussion of what exactly an equitable remedy is. Highlighting the distinction
between equity as a concept in moral and legal philosophy and equity as applied
by modern courts, Part I proceeds to engage with the question of why the distinction between legal and equitable remedies matters and what the shift signifies. After defining equity’s parameters and exploring the move back toward
equity in Part I, this Article turns, in Part II, to examine several equitable remedies that parties, and sometimes nonparties, have sought in criminal cases, with
varying degrees of success.
Finally, Part III begins the work of contemplating the significance of the
courts’ engagement with this topic. Employing equity in the criminal law context may provide relief to some of the more vexing criminal justice issues of our
time. Against the backdrop of a half-century of increasingly punitive impulses,
equitable remedies could play a crucial role in tempering out the substantive
law’s overinclusivity, the narrowing of procedural protections for criminal defendants, and the staggering expansion of criminal sentences in the form of
both detention lengths and monetary sanctions imposed. Equity in the context
of criminal jurisprudence is worth renewed consideration.

14. Federal Injunctions and State Enforcement of Invalid Criminal Statutes, supra note 13, at 649; Robert A.
Leflar, Equitable Prevention of Public Wrongs, 14 TEX. L. REV. 427, 427 (1936).
15. Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical
Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 920 (1987) (citing ROBERT M. HUGHES, HANDBOOK OF JURISDICTION
AND PROCEDURE IN UNITED STATES COURTS 418–20 (2d ed. 1913)).
16. Fred O. Smith highlights one particular aspect of this trend in his groundbreaking article, Abstention
in the Time of Ferguson. See Smith, supra note 12. But, to this author’s knowledge, his is the only work to draw
attention to any aspect of this equitable revolution in the criminal sphere.
17. Because the courts’ consideration of equity is limited to remedies identified by the Chancery
Courts, most of these remedies for harms occurring in the context of criminal cases are pursued in civil-styled
actions.
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I. EQUITY AND CRIMINAL LAW
Any discussion of equity has to begin with a common understanding of
how we define the concept, as the term “equity” can be interpreted in many
different ways. At one end of the spectrum is a broad interpretation of equity,
referring to a general notion of fairness. Ancient Greek and Roman philosophers identified equity as a method of judging so “as to respond with sensitivity
to all the particulars of a person and situation.”18 They conceptualized equity as
“taking up a gentle and lenient cast of mind toward human wrongdoing.”19 At
the other end is the narrow conception of equity that references a specific body
of doctrines and rules contemplated in English Chancery Courts and applied in
the United States after its founding.20
Most modern courts’ consideration of equity is limited to the circumscribed
set of remedies that emerged in the seventeenth century with the curtailment of
the Chancery Courts’ discretion. An understanding of how equity initially was
envisioned and incorporated into our legal system and an explanation as to how
equity currently manifests are important for understanding why the courts’ current openness to equitable remedies matters. After all, how courts ultimately
define equity informs how they approach equity. This Part lays out the differing
conceptions of the term “equity” before turning, in the next Part, to discuss
how equity has been applied in recent years in criminal jurisprudence.
A. Moral Philosophy Conception of Equity
Ancient Greek and Roman philosophers embraced an expansive view of
equity. These philosophers identified equity as a method of judging so “as to
respond with sensitivity to all the particulars of a person and situation.”21 They
conceptualized this approach as “taking up a gentle and lenient cast of mind
toward human wrongdoing.”22 As moral philosopher Martha Nussbaum describes it, “[t]he world of epieikeia or equity . . . is a world of imperfect human
efforts and of complex obstacles to doing well, a world in which humans sometimes deliberately do wrong, but sometimes also get tripped up by ignorance,
passion, poverty, bad education, or circumstantial constraints of various sort.”23

18. Martha C. Nussbaum, Equity and Mercy, 22 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 83, 85 (1993).
19. Id. at 87.
20. See Richard H.W. Maloy, Expansive Equity Jurisprudence: A Court Divided, 40 SUFFOLK U. L. REV.
641, 642 (2007).
21. Nussbaum, supra note 18, at 85. This concept was identified by the term “epieikeia.” Id.
22. Id. at 87.
23. Id. at 91–92.
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From this view, equity is seen as a complement to or a “‘correcting’ and ‘completing’ of [strict] legal justice.”24 Rather than having to choose between equity
and the rule of law, justice requires a consideration of both:
The point of the rule of law is to bring us as close as possible to what equity
would discern in a variety of cases, given the dangers of carelessness, bias, and
arbitrariness endemic to any totally discretionary procedure. But no such rules
can be precise or sensitive enough, and when they have manifestly erred, it is
justice itself, not a departure from justice, to use equity’s flexible standard.25

Equity is often used interchangeably with the term “mercy,”26 although, as
Nussbaum points out, the two are distinct categories. Professor Andrea Roth
explains the distinction in the following way: “Unlike equity, which is a necessary part of rendering overinclusive laws just, mercy is leniency granted by the
grace of private persons beyond what justice alone demands or even allows.”27
Nussbaum herself has articulated the distinction by identifying equity as “the
ability to judge in such a way as to respond with sensitivity to all the particulars
of a person and situation” and mercy as “the ‘inclination of the mind’ toward
leniency in punishing.”28 As such, equity is a necessary part of justice, whereas
mercy goes a step beyond “gentleness . . . beyond due proportion.”29
Put another way, “at every point [equity] presuppose[s] the existence of
common law.”30 As Roth clarifies,
[E]quitable discretion is not understood by moral philosophers as a flouting
of the law, but as a necessary part of making it whole; that is, equity “may be
regarded as a ‘correcting’ and ‘completing’ of legal justice.” Logically, then, the
more potentially overbroad a rule of criminal liability and punishment, the
greater the need for equity.31

Professor Josh Bowers provides a similar explanation, “Law needs equitable
discretion to ‘mitigate or temper’ broad statutes, and equity needs law to provide the superstructure. Thus, equity and law are not mutually exclusive; rather,
equity may serve to refine law.”32 Equity is the counterpart to law, both of which
are necessary components of justice.

24. Id. at 93.
25. Id. at 96.
26. See Bowers, supra note 12, at 1681 (citing Nussbaum, supra note 18, at 85–86).
27. Roth, supra note 12, at 1285; cf. Timothy A.O. Endicott, The Conscience of the King: Christopher St.
German and Thomas More and the Development of English Equity, 47 U. TORONTO FAC. L. REV. 549, 554 (1989)
(citing Saint Cyprian’s maxim: “[E]quity is justice tempered by the sweetness of mercy”).
28. Nussbaum, supra note 18, at 85–86.
29. Id. at 97.
30. Maitland, The Origin of Equity (II), in EQUITY: ALSO THE FORMS OF ACTION AT COMMON LAW,
supra note 13, at 12, 19.
31. Roth, supra note 12, at 1285 (footnote omitted) (quoting Nussbaum, supra note 18, at 93).
32. Bowers, supra note 12, at 1671 (footnotes omitted) (quoting FREDERICK SCHAUER, PROFILES,
PROBABILITIES, AND STEREOTYPES 42 (2003)).
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Yet this corrective vision of equity has been viewed through a restrictive
lens by English and American courts. As one equities scholar from the early
twentieth century observed, “The systems of jurisprudence in our courts both
of law and equity are now equally artificial systems, founded in the same principles of justice and positive law; but varied by different usages in the forms
and mode of their proceedings . . . .”33 Rather than applying equity as a complement to legal justice, courts approach equity as a set of solidified principles
derived from the English Court of Chancery, from which deviation is not permitted. Consequently, these equitable remedies are only occasionally available
as corrective measures even when a legal remedy leaves an unsatisfactory result.
B. Equity as Derived from Chancery Courts
Initially, equity entailed a recognition that inflexible legal rules and remedies
do not always address the full complement of factors relevant to a given situation, leaving some party or issue unsatisfactorily resolved when only legal rules
are invoked. Equity was intended to be a corrective to this lacuna, a method of
facilitating a just result when legal rules fail. As Alexander Hamilton declared,
“The great and primary use of a court of equity is to give relief in extraordinary
cases, which are exceptions to general rules.”34 However, equity evolved from
a conscience-driven framework that chancellors used to grant relief to deserving
parties when a legal option was unavailing to a set of settled principles governing particular aspects of jurisdiction, procedure, substantive law, and remedies.35 As part of this evolution, equity courts ceased to view criminal cases as
being in their orbit.
Early in English history, courts approached equity in the manner contemplated by moral philosophers—as a method of correcting, completing, and refining legal rules. Equity offered relief to both procedural and substantive deficiencies in the courts of law.36 In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries,
England developed a two-court system with courts of law and courts of equity.37 Parties appealed to courts of equity, also known as Chancery Courts, to
“relieve the petitioner from an alleged injustice that would result from rigorous
application of the common law.”38 A petitioner could turn to a court of equity
only if their concerns were not sufficiently addressed by the existing legal rules

33. Maitland, The Origin of Equity (II), in EQUITY: ALSO THE FORMS OF ACTION AT COMMON LAW,
supra note 13, at 12, 19 (quoting 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *429).
34. Michael T. Morley, The Federal Equity Power, 59 B.C. L. REV. 217, 231 (2018) (quoting THE
FEDERALIST NO. 83, at 438 (Alexander Hamilton) (George W. Carey & James McClellan eds., 2001)).
35. See id. at 232.
36. Thomas O. Main, Traditional Equity and Contemporary Procedure, 78 WASH. L. REV. 429, 442 (2003)
(citing Robert Severns, Nineteenth Century Equity: A Study in Law Reform, 12 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 81, 84 (1934)).
37. Id.
38. Subrin, supra note 15, at 918.
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and remedies.39 Chancellors, who were usually bishops,40 decided these appeals
to conscience, resulting in a remedial order for a defendant “to perform or not
perform a specific act.”41 Chancellors were to “consider the larger moral issues
and questions of fairness” in adjudicating these claims.42 As a result, equity jurisdiction allowed courts to consider “the broader and deeper reality behind
appearances, and the subtleties forbidden by the formalized” processes of
strictly applied law.43 Equity courts were therefore “more flexible, discretionary,
and individualized.”44 Equity and law courts worked in tandem with one another, with equity seen “as a necessary companion” to common law.45
This broad conception of equity began to change in the sixteenth century.
Consistent with the corrective view of equity, early chancellors decided cases
solely based on their “conscience,” with little regard for precedent.46 “Chancellors exercised extremely broad discretion, doing justice in individual cases based
on their personal notions of fairness, informed by natural law principles . . . .”47
As a result, “[e]quity enabled the continued development of the law despite the
rigidity of the common-law courts.”48 Without equity, the common law remained stilted, unable to respond appropriately to situations that manifestly
warranted relief.
A tension remained, however, between “Church and king [that] was institutionalized in the Chancery: the chancellor was a minister of the crown, and
yet he was also, by the king’s own custom, an eminent churchman.”49 This tension, combined with the reality of the chancellors’ essentially unlimited discretion, led Chancery Courts to receive substantial pushback from both the reigning king and those who believed the law needed to be uniform and certain.50
After Lord Chancellor Thomas Wolsey “proved unable to secure a papal annulment of Henry’s marriage to Katherine of Aragon,” the demise of equity as
a conscience-based force external to the common law proceeded apace.51

39. Id. at 920.
40. Id.; see also Endicott, supra note 27, at 549–50 (“[E]quity developed as the expression of a conscience
founded on the authority of the Church . . . .”).
41. Subrin, supra note 15, at 918–19; see also Main, supra note 36, at 441.
42. Subrin, supra note 15, at 919.
43. Id. at 918.
44. Id. at 920.
45. Id.
46. Main, supra note 36, at 445 (quoting 1 JOHN NORTON POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY
JURISPRUDENCE § 385, at 524 (2d ed. 1892)).
47. Morley, supra note 34, at 227; see also Endicott, supra note 27, at 553 (“Decisions were rendered at
the pure discretion of the chancellor, and without written reasons.”).
48. Morley, supra note 34, at 228 (citing 2 WILLIAM SEARLE HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH
LAW 346–47 (A.L. Goodhart & H.G. Hanbury eds., 7th ed. 1956)).
49. Endicott, supra note 27, at 552.
50. Main, supra note 36, at 444–46.
51. Endicott, supra note 27, at 555–57.
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Ultimately, when Francis Bacon became Lord Chancellor in 1618, he transformed the Chancery by issuing “one hundred rules of equity.”52 These directives led equity courts to rule in “more circumscribed, if not predictable” ways.53
Under subsequent chancellors, the jurisdiction of equity became more “crystallized,” turning equity into a “system of rules established by precedent”54 structured similarly to the common law.55 As a result, equity lost “its freedom, elasticity and luminance.”56 By the early nineteenth century, equity had become
“bound and confined by the channels of its own precedents and the technicalities of its own procedures” in a manner that mirrored courts of law.57 By the
time equity courts migrated to the United States, equity had become “fixed”
and “certain,”58 an “internal mechanism of correction for the common law.”59
As Thomas Endicott has observed, “In this view of equity, there is no longer
any external check on the law at all, but only an internal process of reconciling
a rule to its rationale.”60
Despite these limitations—and, perhaps, because of them—equity continued to be an integral part of the English legal system and, from its inception,
the burgeoning legal system in the United States. In the face of some skepticism,61 federal courts and many state courts in the United States embraced equity courts. The United States Constitution granted federal courts jurisdiction
over certain cases “in Law and Equity.”62 The Judiciary Act of 1789 likewise
gave federal circuit courts jurisdiction over “suits of a civil nature at common
law or in equity.”63 The first rules promulgated by the Supreme Court in 1822
allowed for equity jurisdiction in all cases where “the rules prescribed by this
court or by the Circuit Court do not apply.”64 The first set of Federal Equity
Rules contained thirty-three “concise rules of practice and procedure”65

52. Main, supra note 36, at 447.
53. Id. at 448.
54. Id. (first quoting James O’Connor, Thoughts About the Common Law, 3 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 161, 164
(1928); then quoting Severns, supra note 36, at 105–06).
55. Morley, supra note 34, at 230.
56. Main, supra note 36, at 448.
57. Id. at 448–49.
58. Id. at 449 (quoting Severns, supra note 36, at 106).
59. Endicott, supra note 27, at 564, 559.
60. Id. at 563.
61. Morley, supra note 34, at 230.
62. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
63. Morley, supra note 34, at 232 (quoting Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 73, 78).
64. JAMES LOVE HOPKINS, THE NEW FEDERAL EQUITY RULES 5 (1913).
65. Main, supra note 36, at 469; EQUITY RULES (1822) (repealed 1842), reprinted in HOPKINS, supra note
64, at 37–42. Two further sets of equity rules were promulgated in 1842 and 1912 before the courts of law
and equity merged. Main, supra note 36, at 469–70.
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grounded in the Constitution, which, according to the Supreme Court, bestowed “original jurisdiction of equity causes . . . in the district courts.”66
Shortly after the Continental Congress allowed colonies to adopt the common
law of England, many states established equity courts or at least permitted common law judges to hear equity cases.67
Both the rules and courts of equity generally contemplated equity’s application only in civil cases, however. Equity rarely was applied in the context of
criminal law.68 Although parallels existed in the context of equity’s procedural
rules,69 equity seldom was seen in criminal cases in its substantive, remedial, and
defensive applications. As Doug Rendleman has clarified, “Substantive areas
formerly associated with Chancery are trusts, fiduciary relationships, mortgages
and liens, wills, estates, and divorce,” many of which “have developed into independent substantive-law fields, often heavily statutory” in nature70 but none
of which have much overlap with criminal law.
Remedies remained available in equity that were not present in law, such as
preliminary and permanent injunctions, specific performance, subrogation,
constructive trusts, disgorgement, and restitution.71 Remedies at law typically
only pertained to “attempt[ing] to obtain a specified amount of money from
the defendant,” whereas equitable remedies could prohibit the defendant from
66. HOPKINS, supra note 64, at 8 (citing JAMES LOVE HOPKINS, THE NEW ANNOTATED FEDERAL
JUDICIAL CODE § 24 (1911)) (with an exception for those cases in which original jurisdiction is conferred on
the Supreme Court). The rules are strikingly procedure-based, resembling the future Rules of Civil Procedure
more than any articulation of guiding substantive principles. In fact, the Federal Equity Rules of 1912 did
end up being the model for the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which ultimately were adopted and governed
the merged law and equity system. Subrin, supra note 15, at 970, 973.
67. Main, supra note 36, at 449–50; Morley, supra note 34, at 230; Subrin, supra note 15, at 928. In fact,
equity courts remain a part of the legal landscape today. Virginia did not merge its courts of law and equity
until 2006, and Delaware continues to have the Delaware Chancery, “the nation’s premier business court.”
Doug Rendleman, The Triumph of Equity Revisited: The Stages of Equitable Discretion, 15 NEV. L.J. 1397, 1402
(2015). Bankruptcy courts are also courts of equity. Main, supra note 36, at 510.
68. See, e.g., In re Sawyer, 124 U.S. 200, 210 (1888) (“The office and jurisdiction of a court of equity,
unless enlarged by express statute, are limited to the protection of rights of property. It has no jurisdiction
over the prosecution, the punishment, or the pardon of crimes or misdemeanors, or over the appointment
and removal of public officers. . . . Any jurisdiction over criminal matters that the English court of chancery
ever had became obsolete long ago, except as incidental to its peculiar jurisdiction for the protection of
infants, or under its authority to issue writs of habeas corpus for the discharge of persons unlawfully imprisoned.”).
69. In the context of equity’s procedural rules, the narrowness in equity’s application meant parties to
criminal cases were not given the same flexibility civil litigants could access when facing procedural impediments. However, until the merger of law and equity in 1938, civil and criminal procedures paralleled each
other in the courts of law. Ion Meyn, Why Civil and Criminal Procedure Are So Different: A Forgotten History, 86
FORDHAM L. REV. 697, 699, 701 (2017). As William Clark wrote in 1918, “‘[T]he rules and principles of
pleading with respect to . . . a civil action are applicable to [a criminal] indictment . . . where the criminal law
is silent as to the form of an indictment in a particular case,’ a litigant could look to ‘pleading in civil actions’
for guidance.” Id. at 701–02 (alteration in original) (quoting WILLIAM L. CLARK, HANDBOOK OF CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE 158 (William E. Mikell ed., 2d ed. 1918)). Notably, this parallel between civil and criminal procedure did not continue despite initial indications that the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure might mirror
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See id. at 698.
70. Rendleman, supra note 67, at 1402.
71. Id. at 1404; Main, supra note 36, at 477–78.
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acting or require her to do so and do so in a particular manner.72 Put another
way, “[r]elief in equity . . . tended to be specific, rather than substitutionary.”73
But again these remedies primarily applied in the civil context.74 A note from
the Harvard Law Review in 1900 observed, “It was the old idea . . . that courts of
equity had no jurisdiction to enjoin criminal proceedings of any sort.”75
In light of equity’s historical roots—both the moral-philosophy roots and
those grounded in the early history of equity courts in England—this limitation
of equity to civil cases seems somewhat surprising. Certainly early equity courts
did not distinguish between civil and criminal cases. This narrowing of equity’s
scope led one early-twentieth-century scholar to observe that criminal equity
“was always unpopular; and gradually, as the government became more stable
and the courts of law more efficient, the need for a criminal equity lessened,
and little by little the chancellor’s criminal jurisdiction fell off, until finally toward the end of the fifteenth century its exercise ceased entirely.”76 By that
point, “almost all criminal justice was gradually being claimed for the king; such
justice was a profitable source of revenue, of forfeitures, fines and amercements.”77 Instead of relying on equity “[f]or the mere vindication of the criminal
law and the enforcement of the public policy of the state, . . . the legal remedy
by indictment and prosecution [was seen as] fully adequate and peculiarly appropriate.”78 In other words, a court sitting in “equity will not interfere with the
enforcement of criminal law.”79
Consequently, even prior to the merger of law and equity, neither parties
nor judges invoked equity as a consideration in criminal cases. After the enactment of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which contemplated the procedural rules subsuming the remainder of equitable rules and remedies into a new
statutory framework, the presumption became that equitable remedies were of
limited applicability in the civil context as well.

72. Morley, supra note 34, at 228.
73. Id.
74. In recent years, restitution has seen a resurgence in criminal cases, but the term “restitution,”
historically thought to mean the disgorgement of an unlawful gain, hardly seems to fit the remedy applied in
most criminal cases these days. See infra Part II.C.
75. Note, Injunctions Against Criminal Proceedings, 14 HARV. L. REV. 293, 293 (1900) (citation omitted).
76. Edwin S. Mack, The Revival of Criminal Equity, 16 HARV. L. REV. 389, 391 (1903).
77. Maitland, Lecture II, in EQUITY: ALSO THE FORMS OF ACTION AT COMMON LAW, supra note 13,
at 306, 306.
78. 30A C.J.S. Equity § 66 (2018).
79. Graham v. Phinizy, 51 S.E.2d 451, 457 (Ga. 1949).
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C. Courts’ Current Consideration of Equity
For a time, equity seemed to have met its demise. Fusion ruled the day.
Most judges and scholars viewed the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as a set
of laws that expressly limited the applicability and validity of equitable rules,
procedures, and remedies in civil cases. And because equity did not generally
engage with criminal proceedings, equity appeared an antiquated conception
that had finally met its end. Yet this belief in the apparent end to equity turns
out to have been premature. Openings remained that courts continued to expand and parties have started to use. As several scholars have illuminated,
courts engaged in a quiet return to equitable remedies in civil cases when confronted with situations that current laws simply did not seem to adequately or
appropriately address.80 Internationally, an active discussion about whether the
fusion of law and equity is truly possible—and even if so, whether it is a good
idea—remains ongoing.81
To date, however, no one has paid much attention to whether a similar
trend is or should be occurring in the context of criminal cases.82 The presumption continues to be that equity simply does not apply to criminal cases. Yet an
examination of case law reveals that, contrary to expectation, equity has been
resurrected in the context of criminal cases as well. In a manner not inconsistent
with the rare applications of equity to criminal cases in the early twentieth century,83 courts are gradually employing equity to address issues separate from the
merits of the charged crime. So long as equity is not being used to challenge the
actual indictment or to address the evidence of the underlying charge, most
courts do not see equitable remedies as being wholly inapplicable to criminal
cases. Those courts acknowledge the continuing importance of equitable remedies to provide relief in the very narrow category of cases where the existing
legal scheme leaves a criminal defendant or crime victim in a troubling position
without appropriate recourse from a traditional legal remedy.84 Thus, despite
the intended merger between equity and law, equity remains a complement to
statutory and common law in a narrow class of cases. In the criminal context,
courts and parties invoke equitable remedies to supplement the legal remedies
available.
80. See, e.g., Bray, supra note 6, at 999, 1004; Main, supra note 36, at 477–78; Maloy, supra note 20, at
670, 676.
81. SAMET, supra note 6, at 2; Lionel Smith, Common Law and Equity in R3RUE, 68 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 1185, 1193 (2011).
82. See supra note 16.
83. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
84. In every example from a criminal case about which this author knows, equity has concurrent jurisdiction with law. “Concurrent jurisdiction” refers to scenarios where “the plaintiff has a legal right and yet
goes to Equity for some remedy that the common law cannot provide. Injunctions and specific performance
are the core examples.” Smith, supra note 81, at 1195; see also Samuel L. Bray, Equity and the Seventh Amendment 3–4 (Feb. 7, 2019) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=3237907.
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This increased reliance on equitable remedies to resolve certain criminal
issues is not a development that should go unnoticed. But why is this development significant? Why does the distinction between law and equity even matter?
Why isn’t this division just a historical relic, an outdated system that sets the
backdrop for our current procedure and remedies but that has evolved past the
point of utility or importance?
At its core, equity continues to maintain an “overtone . . . of general fairness or justice,”85 a “philosophical and theological conception of conscience . . .
that more than any others influenced equity.”86 In Professor Irit Samet’s estimation,
Equity . . . plays the essential role of promoting a legal virtue that is neglected
by Common Law’s fixation on the ideal of the ROL [rule of law]. This legal
virtue, which I call ‘Accountability Correspondence’, requires that legal liability tallies with the pattern of moral duty in the circumstances to which it applies. . . . [B]y attending to the ethical underpinnings of the parties’ rights and
duties, [Equity] reintroduces equilibrium between ‘Accountability Correspondence’ and the ROL.87

Samet recognizes that equity can play a critical role in the resolution of criminal
cases, observing:
The impetus to implement the Accountability Correspondence ideal is vividly
demonstrated in the slow but determined move to lessen the effects of ‘legal
luck’ on criminal responsibility. The idea behind these efforts is that criminal
responsibility should reflect the fact that (at least in principle) moral responsibility does not depend on factors over which the agent has no control.88

Although the manner in which courts currently employ equity does not go as
far as she suggests it might, given courts’ deep aversion to using equity in any
evaluation of the merits of a prosecution, one begins to understand the important role that equity can play in balancing out the disparities and inequities
regularly arising in criminal cases.
In a review of Samet’s book, Professor Samuel Bray recognizes that “the
need for accountability correspondence may be greatest in the criminal law” but
asserts that “it is precisely in the criminal law that there has been no role for
equity for four centuries.”89 A recognition of equity’s renewed presence in the
resolution of particular aspects of a criminal case is necessary to counter this
continued narrative that equity has not been utilized in criminal jurisprudence
85. Mike MacNair, Equity and Conscience, 27 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 659, 659 (2007).
86. SAMET, supra note 6, at 11 (quoting CARLETON KEMP ALLEN, LAW IN THE MAKING 389 (6th ed.
1958)).
87. Id. at 2.
88. Id. at 28–29.
89. Samuel L. Bray, A Parsimonious Equity?: Discussion of Equity: Conscience Goes to Market,
JERUSALEM REV. LEGAL STUD. (forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 9), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=3289735.
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for four hundred years. Undoubtedly, equity’s role is limited, given courts’ refusal to interfere in the merits of a prosecution. But as the next Part of this
Article illustrates, equity’s potential to resolve other aspects of a criminal case
is critical to a fair system of criminal justice.
Indeed, Bray himself acknowledges equity’s hallmarks as, among others, “a
concern not so much with the definition of rights as with the abuse of rights, a
morally inflected language, a consideration of the relative moral position of the
parties, a single expert decisionmaker who takes in the whole, . . . in personam
remedies, conditional relief, and a set of flexible devices for supervising performance.”90 One can imagine how equitable relief might serve a person on probation, suddenly subject to unexpected, costly conditions imposed by the private probation company supervising her, and then incarcerated for being unable
to pay the costs of those newly imposed conditions. An injunction prohibiting
the company from acting ultra vires in this manner could be a useful and effective remedy.
Particularly in the context of criminal cases, then, one begins to see why
equity remains salient. The current criminal system errs on the side of rigidity
and inflexibility. In light of the immense power given to prosecutors,91 judges
have a relatively limited ability to take individual circumstances into consideration, and consequently, defense attorneys have relatively limited arguments they
can reasonably make for judges to consider. In the rare instances in which juries
are involved, they are not told they have the power to nullify if they see fit.
Sentencing is the most obvious forum in which a judge can individualize a remedy, yet statutory mandatory minimums, penalty provisions, and other collateral
consequences regularly tie judges’ hands. Equity—with its focus on fairness,
protection of rights, and moral conscience—provides some avenue for judges to
work within and around these statutory constraints, even in its narrowly conceived form.
With an understanding of the potential impact equity can have in a criminal
case, one begins to understand why courts are now entertaining these remedies
in a manner they might not have previously. To be sure, parties are seeking
these remedies with greater frequency. This may just be creative lawyering. But
in light of the punitive, regressive instinct currently manifest in criminal justice
policies and laws, defendants and their lawyers are looking for new avenues of
relief. When other methods of obtaining relief are unavailing, particularly in
compelling cases, those feeling railroaded by the criminal legal system are turning to remedial mechanisms relatively unexplored in recent times. And courts
likely are entertaining these remedies for similar reasons—to help respond to

90. Bray, supra note 84, at 6.
91. See, e.g., JOHN F. PFAFF, LOCKED IN: THE TRUE CAUSES OF MASS INCARCERATION—AND HOW
TO ACHIEVE REAL REFORM 133 (2017).
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legal processes and laws that seem to result in blatantly unfair, and often unconstitutional, outcomes. Equitable remedies allow for a limited release valve
that can be used to obtain the right outcome when legal remedies fail.
Courts also may be engaging with these remedies with increasing regularity
because of the systematic nature of certain criminal justice issues. Although
some equitable remedies employed in criminal cases apply solely to the petitioner seeking the remedy in that case, such as restitution or specific performance in the context of plea bargaining, in other instances, the remedy sought
is systemic, sought on behalf of a class of individuals seeking relief, as in the
case of injunctions. For some, the pursuit of systemic relief through circumstances arising out of an individual criminal case is both unexpected and somewhat jarring. After all, criminal cases are usually the-government-versus-oneor-a-few-defendants affairs. Yet one can understand how bail policies or probation conditions imposed by a private probation company affect more than
the individual criminal defendant. These systemic policies have an impact on
numerous similarly situated individuals, and the relief sought would seem anemic if just granted in one individual case.92 For this reason, attorneys often seek
to certify similarly situated individuals challenging the policies and practices as
a class so that the relief hopefully gained for one can be shared by others experiencing unjust policies. Although it is an unusual move in criminal cases, this
application of equity should not be quite as surprising as it may feel, as the
creation of a “class suit” originally arose out of equity.93 In fact, many wellestablished criminal defense offices have long taken on the work of challenging
systemic issues that affect hundreds or thousands of people under criminal
court supervision or suffering from a criminal conviction.94 Equity provides
both a procedural mechanism for seeking systemic relief and a remedy for the
harms that would otherwise be litigated individually in case after case.

92. In contrast to the normal criminal case, which litigates charges against one or several distinct individuals, class action cases are brought on behalf of multiple similarly situated individuals, and the remedies
applied correspondingly. Thus the scope of the remedy tends to reach farther than in the average criminal
case. To be clear, this Article takes no position in the hotly contested debate about the scope of injunctions
and whether they can or should apply nationwide. See, e.g., Michael T. Morley, Nationwide Injunctions, Rule
23(b)(2), and the Remedial Powers of the Lower Courts, 97 B.U. L. REV. 615 (2017); Zayn Siddique, Nationwide
Injunctions, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 2095 (2017); Amanda Frost, In Defense of Nationwide Injunctions, 93 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1065 (2018).
93. Bray, supra note 84, at 23.
94. For example, the Public Defender Service for the District of Columbia has a Special Litigation
Division that “handles a wide variety of litigation that seeks to vindicate the constitutional and statutory rights
of PDS clients and to challenge pervasive unfair criminal justice practices.” Special Litigation Division, PUB.
DEFENDER SERV. FOR D.C., https://www.pdsdc.org/about-us/legal-services/special-litigation-division (last
visited Oct. 7, 2019). The Bronx Defenders has an Impact Litigation practice as well. Impact Litigation, BRONX
DEFENDERS, https://www.bronxdefenders.org/programs/impact-litigation/ (last visited Oct. 7, 2019).
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II. EQUITY IN ACTION
With some understanding as to what this Article refers when discussing the
term “equitable remedy,” Part II turns to an examination of when and how
courts utilize equitable remedies in the resolution of criminal cases or proceedings closely intertwined with criminal cases. A survey of case law reveals that
both lower courts and the Supreme Court have increasingly relied on equitable
remedies in cases where the available legal remedies simply do not seem to adequately address the issues raised. Criminal defendants seek injunctions to rectify unnecessary pretrial detention, challenge unconstitutional bail practices,
change prosecutor behavior, or rectify unlawful probation and parole conditions. The Supreme Court has invoked specific performance in noteworthy
cases regarding the government’s obligations in, and ineffective assistance of
counsel claims during, the plea-bargaining process. Restitution is the most recognizable equitable remedy in criminal cases today, yet courts usually apply it as
a legal remedy rather than a strictly equitable one. The range of harms that can
be addressed by equitable remedies is fairly broad, as the cases reveal.
A. Injunctive Relief
In recent years, criminal defendants have sought preventive relief through
injunctions. In all of the cases discussed here, criminal defendants as civil plaintiffs sought injunctions to remedy some type of harm experienced in their criminal cases. Generally, injunctive relief is sought for one of several broad reasons:
to rectify unnecessary pretrial detention; to challenge unconstitutional bail practices; to challenge the imposition of criminal fines and fees; to change prosecutor behavior; to rectify unlawful probation and parole conditions; or to remedy
problematic prison conditions. Many of these requests for injunctions have
been successful.
The vast majority of crimes are prosecuted at the state level. Prior to Younger
v. Harris,95 under established principles of equity, an individual charged with a
state crime could challenge certain aspects of that prosecution, or anticipated
prosecution, in federal court.96 Based on an early twentieth-century case, when
the courts of law and equity were still distinct, federal courts could enjoin state
criminal proceedings, such as in a case where the plaintiff alleged that the statute
under which she was being prosecuted was unconstitutional.97 As the Supreme
Court announced in the cornerstone case, Ex parte Young,

95. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
96. See, e.g., Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159–60 (1908); Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 492
(1965).
97. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. at 159–60; Smith, supra note 12, at 2290.
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[I]ndividuals, who, as officers of the State, are clothed with some duty in regard to the enforcement of the laws of the State, and who threaten and are
about to commence proceedings, either of a civil or criminal nature, to enforce
against parties affected an unconstitutional act, violating the Federal Constitution, may be enjoined by a Federal court of equity from such action.98

Responding to the argument that courts of equity have no jurisdiction to
intervene in criminal proceedings, the Ex parte Young Court explicitly carved out
an exception “[w]hen such indictment or proceeding is brought to enforce an
alleged unconstitutional statute, which is the subject matter of inquiry in a suit
already pending in a Federal court.”99 In that circumstance, “the latter court
having first obtained jurisdiction over the subject matter, has the right, in both
civil and criminal cases, to hold and maintain such jurisdiction, to the exclusion
of all other courts, until its duty is fully performed.”100
The Court later backtracked from its Ex parte Young holding in a series of
cases beginning with Younger v. Harris101 and culminating in Rizzo v. Goode,102
effectively precluding this avenue of equitable relief in all but the rarest of
cases.103 After Younger, a federal court can enjoin a state criminal prosecution
only if there is no prosecution pending in state court at the time the federal
prosecution is begun, if a “great and immediate” irreparable injury will result if
the federal court does not issue the injunction, and if “the threat to the plaintiff’s federally protected rights . . . cannot be eliminated by his defense against
a single criminal prosecution.”104 A plaintiff who fails to meet this criteria can
nevertheless obtain relief if they can show “bad faith, harassment, or [another]
unusual circumstance that would call for equitable relief.”105
After Younger, although attorneys representing criminal defendants in state
cases can rarely challenge the constitutionality or enforcement of a state statute
in federal courts, they can and have utilized other avenues for obtaining injunctive relief in a state criminal case. Younger generally does not prohibit the injunctions because they are not aimed directly at the prosecution itself but, rather, at
98. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. at 155–56.
99. Id. at 161 (citing Prout v. Starr, 188 U.S. 537, 544 (1903)).
100. Id. at 161–62 (citing Prout, 188 U.S. at 544).
101. 401 U.S. 37 (1971). Arguably, the Court more fully opened the door to the decision in Younger in
a 1965 case, Dombrowski v. Pfister. 380 U.S. 479 (1965). “The initial dominant view was that the case [Dombrowski] boldly opened a new door for civil rights claims against unconstitutional state prosecutions.” Smith,
supra note 12, at 2292. However, prominent scholars—notably Owen Fiss and Douglas Laycock—later
pointed out how “the Dombrowski decision arguably undermined the foundation of precedent on which the
opinion should have stood, leading to the presumption against such injunctions that we generally associate
with Younger v. Harris.” Id. at 2292–93. See generally Owen M. Fiss, Dombrowski, 86 YALE L.J. 1103 (1977);
Douglas Laycock, Federal Interference with State Prosecutions: The Cases Dombrowski Forgot, 46 U. CHI. L. REV.
636 (1979).
102. 423 U.S. 362 (1976); see also Fiss, supra note 101, at 1154.
103. Fiss, supra note 101, at 1154.
104. Younger, 401 U.S. at 45–46 (first quoting Fenner v. Boykin, 271 U.S. 240, 243 (1926); then citing
Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. at 145–47).
105. Id. at 54.
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some specific aspect of the criminal proceeding, such as pretrial detention or
bail, the detention of witnesses, or conditions of probation and parole.106
1. Pretrial Detention of Criminal Defendants
A significant criminal procedure case, Gerstein v. Pugh,107 is an early example
of how the Supreme Court relies on equity to grant relief in a criminal case
despite Younger. In Dade County, Florida, prior to the litigation in Gerstein, prosecutors could charge a person by an information with any noncapital crime and
detain the person subject to that charge, usually for thirty days or more, without
a preliminary hearing—the proceeding where a judge determines whether there
is probable cause that the person committed the crime.108 In other words, the
charged individual could have her liberty restrained for a hefty period of time
on the allegation of only a prosecutor, without any judicial review to determine
whether sufficient evidence existed to establish probable cause.
Robert Pugh and Nathaniel Henderson filed a class action seeking injunctive relief in federal district court, “claiming a constitutional right to a judicial
hearing on the issue of probable cause.”109 The trial court granted the injunction, holding that the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments give all arrested persons charged by information a right to “an immediate preliminary hearing to
determine probable cause for further detention.”110 The Court ordered Dade
County to promptly give the plaintiffs a preliminary hearing to determine probable cause.111 According to the Court, Younger did not prohibit the injunction
because
[t]he injunction was not directed at the state prosecutions as such, but only at
the legality of pretrial detention without a judicial hearing, an issue that could
not be raised in defense of the criminal prosecution. The order to hold preliminary hearings could not prejudice the conduct of the trial on the merits.112

Gerstein paved the way for granting other injunctions, primarily in cases
where criminal defendants are challenging bail or a crime victim or witness is
challenging her detention prior to a trial, as it provides plaintiffs a legal hook to
challenge often lengthy pretrial detentions. Recently, criminal defendants as
106. Some state courts are finding remedies to unconstitutional bail practices at the state level as well,
thereby avoiding the need to seek injunctive relief at the federal level. See, e.g., In re Humphrey, 228 Cal. Rptr.
3d 513, 544 (Cal. Ct. App. 2018). The California District Attorneys Association and several district attorneys’
offices around California subsequently sought depublication of the aforementioned California appellate case,
which the California Supreme Court denied. Humphrey (Kenneth) on H.C., 417 P.3d 769, 769 (Cal. 2018).
But the Court then ordered review of the appellate opinion on its own motion. Id.
107. 420 U.S. 103 (1975).
108. Id. at 105–06.
109. Id. at 107.
110. Id. at 107–08.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 108 n.9.
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civil plaintiffs have been filing suit in jurisdictions across the country, alleging
that their local courts’ bail practices violate the Constitution.113 Several federal
courts have granted such injunctions.114
For example, in 2018, Maranda ODonnell joined other plaintiffs in a class
action suit against Harris County, Texas, alleging that the county’s bail system
for indigent misdemeanor arrestees violated both Texas statutory and constitutional law and the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.115 The
Texas district court granted the injunction after eight days of hearings.116 Agreeing that “the relief sought by ODonnell—i.e., improvement of pretrial procedures and practice—is not properly reviewed by criminal proceedings in state
court,” a panel of the Fifth Circuit found that Younger did not preclude the injunctive relief plaintiffs sought, relying on Gerstein to reach this conclusion.117
Bradley Hester filed a similar suit against officials in Cullman County, Alabama, alleging that the county’s practice of detaining people pretrial who could
not afford to post a property or surety bond violated the Fourteenth Amendment.118 Distinguishing an Eleventh Circuit case in which the circuit court
found the pretrial bail procedures in Calhoun County, Georgia, did not demonstrate a likelihood of success on the claim of wealth-based discrimination in its
bail practices,119 the district court issued a preliminary injunction in Hester’s
113. Smith, supra note 12, at 2285.
114. See, e.g., Walker v. City of Calhoun, No. 4:15-cv-0170-HLM, 2016 WL 361612, at *14 (N.D. Ga.
Jan. 28, 2016), vacated, 682 F. App’x 721 (11th Cir. 2017); Smith, supra note 12, at 2287, 2311–12 (citing
ODonnell v. Harris County, 251 F. Supp. 3d 1052, 1161–64 (S.D. Tex. 2017), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 892
F.3d 147 (5th Cir. 2018)). Plaintiffs have also sought other forms of relief, such as declaratory judgments,
which are considered milder versions of injunctions. See Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 111–12 (1971) (“The
express purpose of the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act was to provide a milder alternative to the injunction
remedy. . . . [T]he declaratory judgment was designed to be available to test state criminal statutes in circumstances where an injunction would not be appropriate . . . .”). However, declaratory judgments are purely a
statutory creation from the twentieth century and therefore do not fall under the category of claims considered equitable claims according to the English Chancery. See Federal Declaratory Judgment Act of June 14,
1934, ch. 512, 48 Stat. 955 (codified as 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (2018)).
115. ODonnell v. Harris County, 882 F.3d 528, 535 (5th Cir. 2018), withdrawn, superseded on reh’g, 892
F.3d 147, 152 (5th Cir. 2018).
116. ODonnell, 892 F.3d at 152.
117. Id. at 156 (citing Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 108 n.9). Harris County et al. petitioned for and received a
rehearing, but the panel reached the same conclusion on this issue as it did in the first instance. Id. On remand,
the district court entered a more narrowly tailored injunction, as ordered by the Fifth Circuit panel. ODonnell
v. Harris County, 321 F. Supp. 3d 763, 778–85 (S.D. Tex. 2018). It differed in certain regards from the
changes suggested by the Fifth Circuit panel, and Harris County et al. sought a stay, which the Fifth Circuit
subsequently granted in August 2018. ODonnell v. Goodhart, 900 F.3d 220, 221 (5th Cir. 2018). Many of the
appellants who sought the stay were voted out of office in November 2018, and the new appellants moved
for voluntary dismissal of the appeal in January 2019. ODonnell v. Salgado, 913 F.3d 479, 481 (5th Cir. 2019).
Plaintiffs (appellees) then sought an unopposed motion to vacate the August 2018 appellate opinion authorizing the stay, which the appellate court denied. Id. at 482.
118. Schultz v. State, 330 F. Supp. 3d 1344, 1348 (N.D. Ala. 2018).
119. Walker v. City of Calhoun, 901 F.3d 1245 (11th Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 1446 (2019).
Notably, the court did find that Younger does not preclude the issuance of an injunction in the context of bail
practices. The court just did not think the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of their argument.
Id. at 1269.
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case, finding he was substantially likely to prevail on his claim of wealth-based
discrimination in Cullman County’s bail practices.120 Younger abstention is nowhere raised in the court’s order.
Federal courts in northern Texas121 and the Middle District of Alabama122
likewise have issued preliminary injunctions in response to plaintiffs’ claims of
wealth-based disparities related to pretrial detention in violation of the U.S.
Constitution. Litigation seeking injunctions against local officials for their pretrial detention and bail practices remains pending in federal district courts in
western Louisiana123 and California.124 The litigation that continues in the Georgia case is on the merits of whether the bail practices in question actually violate
the Constitution, as the district court found that Younger did not preclude the
issuance of an injunction.125 On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit went as far as to
say that Younger “[a]bstention . . . has become disfavored in recent Supreme
Court decisions.”126 The Eleventh Circuit’s view of Younger abstention is by no
means universal, however, as other federal courts have continued to deny injunctions on Younger abstention grounds.127

120. Schultz, 330 F. Supp. 3d at 1358.
121. Daves v. Dallas County, 341 F. Supp. 3d 688, 698 (N.D. Tex. 2018).
122. Edwards v. Cofield, No. 3:17-cv-321-WKW, 2017 WL 2255775, at *1–2 (M.D. Ala. May 8, 2017)
(issuing a temporary restraining order that, according to the court, “requires the same four elements as a
preliminary injunction,” as well as an injunction against further detention of Edwards “based solely on her
inability to pay” (footnote omitted)).
123. Little v. Frederick, No. 6:17-cv-0724, 2019 WL 208947, at *1–2 (W.D. La. Jan. 15, 2019) (outlining the status of a request for an injunction and a declaratory judgment in a challenge to the bail system in
three Louisiana parishes).
124. Buffin v. City and County of San Francisco, No. 15-cv-04959-YGR, 2019 WL 1017537, at *24
(N.D. Cal. Mar. 4, 2019) (“[T]he Court will issue an injunction enjoining the Sheriff from using the Bail
Schedule as a means of releasing a detainee who cannot afford the amount but will delay issuing the injunction
pending briefing.”); Plaintiffs’ Notice of Motion & Motion for Summary Judgment; Memorandum of Points
& Authorities in Support at 1, Buffin, 2018 WL 5003609 (No. 15-cv-04959) (alleging a violation of the Due
Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment in relation to San Francisco’s bail
schedule and seeking an injunction to prohibit the use of a bail schedule and detention of arrestees).
125. Walker v. City of Calhoun, 901 F.3d 1245, 1254 (11th Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 1446
(2019).
126. Id. (citing Sprint Commc’ns Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 77–78 (2013)).
127. See, e.g., Burks v. Scott County, No. 3:14-cv-745-HTW-LRA, at *2 (S.D. Miss. Sept. 30, 2015)
(Bloomberg Law, Dockets); cf. Bice v. La. Pub. Def. Bd., 677 F.3d 712, 715 (5th Cir. 2012) (finding that
Younger’s abstention doctrine prevented plaintiff from pursuing a federal remedy for an alleged violation of
the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments based on a fee that Louisiana requires indigent criminal defendants
to pay to the public defender’s office for appointed counsel’s services). Professor Fred Smith has written a
compelling article outlining why Younger should not preclude injunctive relief in criminal fines, fees, and bail
cases. Smith, supra note 12.
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2. Legal Financial Obligations
Plaintiffs also have sought injunctions related to court fines, fees, and collections.128 In terms of injunctive relief, these claims have been less successful
than many of the bail claims mentioned in the previous Subpart—sometimes
on Younger abstention grounds, sometimes on other grounds.
In a case filed in Louisiana, Cain v. City of New Orleans,129 the plaintiffs challenged New Orleans’s post-conviction debt-collection measures. At sentencing,
judges imposed various court fines, fees, and costs.130 Judges typically imposed
four types of financial obligations in a criminal case at the time of sentencing: a
fine, which was divided between the court’s operating budget and the district
attorney’s office; restitution, which would go to a crime victim; fees, including
a mandatory $5 fee, a fee whose amount was determined by whether the crime
of conviction was a misdemeanor or a felony, $100 in court costs, and a $14 fee
to pay court reporters, all of which went into the court’s operating budget; and
“court costs,” which funded the public defender’s office, the prosecutor’s office, and the Supreme Court.131 Approximately “$1,000,000 [of the court’s annual general operating budget each year] came from bail bond fees, and another
$1,000,000 [came] from fines and other fees.”132
The plaintiffs were individuals convicted of a crime but ultimately unable
to pay the fines, fees, and costs imposed by the court at sentencing.133 All were
arrested on a warrant for contempt of court, based solely on their failure to pay
these financial obligations.134 The warrants set bail at $20,000.135 Individuals arrested pursuant to this type of warrant “ordinarily remained in jail until their
family or friends could make a payment on their court debt, or until a judge
released them.”136 The plaintiffs in this case each remained in jail for a period
of six days to two weeks.137 The plaintiffs alleged violations of their Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendment rights, and they sought declaratory judgments that the
state officials named in the complaint had violated the plaintiffs’ constitutional
rights, an injunction prohibiting defendants from enforcing the unconstitutional policies, and money damages.138

128. See, e.g., Cain v. City of New Orleans, 281 F. Supp. 3d 624, 628 (E.D. La. 2017), aff’d, Cain v.
White, 937 F.3d 446 (5th Cir. 2019).
129. 184 F. Supp. 3d 349 (E.D. La. 2016).
130. Cain, 281 F. Supp. 3d at 628–29.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 630.
133. Id. at 629–31.
134. Id. at 631–32.
135. Id. at 631.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 634.
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The defendants argued that since plaintiffs had not “paid in full” their court
costs, their cases remained pending and would stay pending “until all assessed
costs are paid,”139 thereby precluding Younger relief. The district judge found
Younger abstention inapplicable because each of the defendants had been convicted and sentenced more than a year prior to the filing of the lawsuits in this
case.140 The court noted that each plaintiff’s case was marked as “closed” in the
court record, no plaintiff was incarcerated or had an outstanding warrant for
failure to pay, and none of the plaintiffs directly appealed. Consequently, the
district judge found that “an incomplete sentence, such as an undischarged term
of imprisonment, probation, or parole, does not constitute an ‘ongoing state
judicial proceeding’ for purposes of Younger abstention.”141 The only contested
issue for injunctive relief purposes was “whether plaintiffs, merely because their
court costs remain unpaid, are subject to ongoing state judicial proceedings.”142
The court concluded that the “mere existence of plaintiffs’ undischarged debts
does not constitute an ‘ongoing state judicial proceeding’” for Younger purposes.143
Ultimately, the court dismissed the counts for which the plaintiffs were
seeking injunctive relief.144 However, the court granted the plaintiffs’ summary
judgment motion for a declaratory judgment that the judges’ practice of imposing court fines and fees on a criminal defendant and then imprisoning that person for nonpayment without any determination of her ability to pay violates the
Fourteenth Amendment and the Supreme Court’s holding in Bearden v. Georgia.145
Plaintiffs had less luck in another Louisiana case, Bice v. Louisiana Public Defender Board146—this time on Younger grounds. The plaintiffs were indigent criminal defendants who challenged a $35 fee imposed on convicted defendants at
the end of the criminal proceedings.147 Indigent criminal defendants found not
guilty were not required to pay the fee.148 Steven Bice asserted that this system
violated his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights, as it creates a perverse
139. Cain v. City of New Orleans, 186 F. Supp. 3d 536, 549 (E.D. La. 2016).
140. Id.
141. Id. at 550 (quoting Trombley v. County of Cascade, 879 F.2d 866, at *1 (9th Cir. 1989)).
142. Id.
143. Id. (quoting Trombley, 879 F.2d, at *1).
144. Cain v. City of New Orleans, 281 F. Supp. 3d 624, 633–34 (E.D. La. 2017). The court dismissed
count four, a claim for injunctive relief, as moot. Id. at 637–39. Plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment
on count seven, the second count with a request for injunctive relief, in spite of a court-ordered stay on
certain motion practice. Id. at 634 n.80. As a result, the court dismissed the motion for summary judgment
without prejudice. Id.
145. Id. at 649–52. Bearden requires that a court establish a defendant’s willful failure to pay a fine or
restitution before revoking the defendant’s probation for failure to pay. Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660,
672 (1983).
146. 677 F.3d 712 (5th Cir. 2012).
147. Id. at 714.
148. Id.
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incentive for an indigent defendant’s lawyer to not pursue a finding of not guilty
for her client, given that public defenders are paid in part by the fees collected
only pursuant to a finding of their clients’ guilt.149 Finding that a successful
challenge to the state’s statutory funding scheme would “require the state to
postpone Bice’s prosecution until adequate funding is located,” the district
court concluded this was sufficient federal “‘interference’ with a state court proceeding” to satisfy Younger.150 Because Bice had not yet managed to get a class
certified and did not raise the issue presented in his federal pleading before the
state court, the federal district judge determined that “the municipal court can
simply enjoin the collection of the fee as it pertains to Bice, which would protect
him against any asserted constitutional violations.”151 Consequently, Younger abstention prevented the court from reaching the request for injunctive relief.152
Although plaintiffs have had limited success using injunctions in the context of legal financial obligations, the relative paucity of cases in this area suggests injunctions still may be an effective avenue of obtaining relief.
3. Changing Prosecutor Behavior Toward Witnesses
In several jurisdictions, judges, prosecutors, or both have attempted to coerce reluctant crime victims and witnesses to participate in a prosecution
through the threat of fines and incarceration. Crime victims and witnesses have
turned to equitable injunctions for relief from these practices.
Twenty-two-year-old Cleopatra Harrison appeared in court in Columbus,
Georgia, “at a preliminary hearing for her boyfriend, who was charged with
assaulting her.”153 When asked to affirm the facts as recounted by the officer
during the hearing, Harrison “truthfully affirmed” them but indicated a desire
“not to serve as a witness for the prosecution.”154 With no further inquiry and
according to a municipal ordinance, the judge assessed a $150 “‘victim assessment’ fee” against Harrison, who was indigent and did not have the funds to
pay the fee.155 The court informed her that if she did not pay the fee within a
week, a warrant would issue for her arrest.156 The city’s policy required courts

149. Id. at 714–15.
150. Id. at 717–18 (quoting State v. Citizen, 898 So. 2d 325, 338–39 (La. 2005)).
151. Id. at 719–20.
152. Id. at 720.
153. Complaint at 2, Harrison v. Consol. Gov’t of Columbus, No. 4:16-cv-329-CDL, 2016 WL
5859069 (M.D. Ga. 2016).
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. The police officer who testified at her boyfriend’s hearing, id. at 15–16, arrested Harrison after
the hearing for purportedly filing a false police report, id. at 17–18. When her boyfriend paid to get her out
of jail, it appears as though the $212.50 payment he made to get her out of jail was applied to Harrison’s fee,
as her case was subsequently closed. Id. at 19. Harrison was never given any notice of a hearing date for a
charge of filing a false report. Id.
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to impose a “minimum charge of $50.00 for dismissing a case in recorder’s
court, such charge to be paid by the prosecuting witness that refuses to prosecute the case.”157 Harrison sought an injunction to prevent Columbus court
officials from implementing the ordinance and the court’s customary policy of
ensuring enforcement.158 Ultimately, Harrison’s case against the city and its officers settled, as the city repealed the ordinance upon the filing of the lawsuit
and agreed to compensate those who had paid such fees.159 Thus, an injunction
never issued.
Prosecutors in Orleans Parish, Louisiana, purportedly continue to engage
in a similar practice, but their behavior is even more egregious. According to
the complaint in Singleton v. Cannizzaro, “prosecutors routinely issue their own
fabricated subpoenas directly from the District Attorney’s Office . . . in order
to coerce victims and witnesses into submitting to interrogations by prosecutors
outside of court . . . . [T]hey threaten crime victims and witnesses with fines,
arrest, and imprisonment if they do not obey.”160 If these tactics are unsuccessful, “[d]efendants routinely obtain arrest warrants to put crime victims and witnesses in jail.”161 Once witnesses are arrested on these outstanding warrants, the
complaint avers, “[d]efendants habitually seek and obtain extraordinarily high
secured money bonds . . . ranging up to $500,000, and sometimes no bond at
all. These amounts often dwarf the bond amounts set for criminal defendants
themselves . . . .”162 As a result, witnesses “languish” in jail.163 The complaint
alleges that prosecutors have sought at least 150 material witness warrants in a
recent five-year period, “mak[ing] false statements, omit[ting] material facts, and
rely[ing] on plainly insufficient allegations no reasonable prosecutor would believe could justify the arrest of a witness or a victim of crime.”164 The complaint
lists the stories of seven plaintiffs in support of the summarized allegations.165
Among other relief, the plaintiffs are seeking an injunction and “equitable relief” requiring the prosecutor’s office to permanently end these practices and

157. Id. at 7.
158. Id. at 7–8.
159. Final Approval Order & Judgment, Harrison, 2017 WL 6210319 (No. 4:16-cv-329-CDL); Columbus
Court Abolishes “Victim Fee,” Pays Restitution to Survivors of Crime, S. CTR. FOR HUM. RTS. (Oct. 12, 2017),
https://www.schr.org/resources/columbus_court_abolishes_victim_fee_pays_restitution_to_survivors_
of_crime.
160. Complaint at 2, Singleton v. Cannizzaro, 372 F. Supp. 3d 389 (E.D. La. 2019) (2:17-cv-10721).
161. Id.
162. Id. at 2–3.
163. Id. at 2.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 4–6.
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“ensure[] that the violations do not recur.”166 The litigation remains ongoing,
with claims for injunctive relief still pending before the court.167
It remains unclear whether injunctive relief will be successful in Orleans
Parish.168 Younger abstention does not appear to have been raised by the defendants in the case. In Columbus, Georgia, the legal effort to obtain injunctive
relief brought about change but not directly by way of an injunction. As a result,
the verdict is still out as to whether equitable remedies are an effective mechanism for attempting to change prosecutor behavior.
4. Rectifying Unlawful Probation or Parole Conditions
As of the end of 2016, more than 4.5 million adults, or one in fifty-five,
were under community supervision—on probation or parole—in the U.S.169
This number is double the number of people incarcerated in this country.170
State agencies and local law enforcement traditionally managed the supervision
of individuals under community supervision. However, in many states, community supervision has been increasingly outsourced to for-profit, private companies.171 A recent report from Human Rights Watch observed:
[P]rivate probation companies exert significant control over the lives of people on probation. In the states studied for this report, private probation companies can impose supervision fees, order drug and alcohol tests, and, if a
person does not fulfill all the terms and conditions of their probation, they
can issue a violation of probation and request arrest, which can lead to jail
time.172

Some individuals on probation and parole have started to challenge private
probation companies’ ability to sua sponte impose new conditions on them. At
166. Id. at 61.
167. Although the trial court dismissed several of the plaintiffs’ claims in response to a defense motion
to dismiss, several claims for injunctive relief remain. See Singleton v. Cannizzaro, No. 2:17-cv-10721-JTM,
2019 WL 2755090, at *1 (E.D. La. July 2, 2019); Singleton, 372 F. Supp. 3d at 430.
168. The court entered an order allowing the plaintiffs to proceed with many of their claims, denying
in part the Government’s motion to dismiss. Singleton v. Cannizzaro, No. 2:17-cv-10721-JTM at 51–52 (E.D.
La. Feb. 28, 2019) (order granting in part defendants’ joint motion to dismiss). The defendants appealed the
order, Singleton, 2019 WL 2755090, at *1, and that appeal remains pending in the Fifth Circuit. An injunction
was not issued at this juncture. Singleton v. Cannizzaro, No. 2:17-cv-10721-JTM at 51–52 (E.D. La. Feb. 28,
2019). However, the district court’s language suggests the court is troubled by the allegations in the case. Id.
at 10–11. A recent ruling by the district court confirmed that “[p]laintiffs[’] numerous claims seeking injunctive relief . . . will remain.” Singleton, 2019 WL 2755090, at *3.
169. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PROBATION AND PAROLE IN THE UNITED STATES, 2016
(2018), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ppus16_sum.pdf.
170. Probation and Parole System Marked by High Stakes, Missed Opportunities, PEW CHARITABLE TR. 1, 4
(2018), http://www.pewtrusts.org/-/media/assets/2018/09/probation_and_parole_systems_marked_by_
high_stakes_missed_opportunities_pew.pdf.
171. “Set Up to Fail”: The Impact of Offender-Funded Private Probation on the Poor, HUM. RTS. WATCH 1, 2
(2018), https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/usprobation0218_web.pdf.
172. Id. at 3.
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least two sets of plaintiffs filed to enjoin private probation companies from
requiring probationers to submit to drug testing that was not court ordered and
then making them pay for those tests, threatening revocation and incarceration
if they could not afford to pay. In one case, Luse v. Sentinel Offender Services, LLC,
the parties settled, so no injunction issued.173 However, in a second case, Rodriguez v. Providence Community Corrections, Inc., the district court granted a preliminary injunction enjoining the private probation company from seeking or executing arrest warrants on misdemeanor probationers solely due to the
nonpayment of probation fees174 and from imposing preset secured-money
bonds without any hearing or inquiry into the probationer’s ability to pay, in
violation of the Supreme Court case Bearden v. Georgia.175
In broad language, the district court found that Younger abstention did not
preclude injunctive relief for two reasons:
“Plaintiffs challenge the constitutionality of certain discrete aspects of Defendants’ post-judgment procedure. The harm alleged—that probationers do
not receive inquiries into indigency as required by the Fourteenth Amendment—has been inflicted before a probationer could voice any constitutional
concerns. This alleged constitutional infirmity could be remedied without affecting the underlying state court judgments. . . .” In addition to the fact that
Plaintiffs do not have an adequate opportunity to raise constitutional challenges before they suffer a constitutional injury, the Court finds that an incomplete sentence, such as an undischarged term of imprisonment, probation,
or parole, does not constitute an ‘ongoing state judicial proceeding’ for purposes of Younger abstention.176

Ultimately, because Rutherford County, Tennessee, chose not to renew its
contract with Providence Community Corrections, the claims became moot.177
However, the court noted that since “[t]he County [itself] intend[ed] to take
over the supervision of misdemeanor probationers,” the possibility remained
that “the County could resume the constitutionally infirm conduct.”178 As such,
the equitable claims against the County were still viable. This case, too, ultimately settled, with the County agreeing to an injunction that
under the County’s probation program, ‘no individual may be held in jail for
nonpayment of fines, fees, costs, or a pre-probation revocation money bond
imposed by a court without a determination, following a meaningful inquiry
173. Luse v. Sentinel Offender Servs., LLC, No. 2:16-cv-30-RWS (N.D. Ga. Aug. 21, 2017) (Bloomberg Law, Dockets) (order granting final approval of class settlement).
174. Rodriguez v. Providence Cmty. Corr., Inc., 191 F. Supp. 3d 758, 762 (M.D. Tenn. 2016).
175. 461 U.S. 660 (1983).
176. Rodriguez, 191 F. Supp. 3d. at 763 (citation omitted) (quoting Rodriguez v. Providence Cmty.
Corr., Inc., No 3:15-cv-01048-MTT (M.D. Tenn. Dec. 17, 2015) (memorandum decision granting preliminary
injunction, appearing as Document 68 on the docket)) (citing Trombley v. County of Cascade, 879 F.2d 866
(9th Cir. 1989)).
177. Id. at 770–72. The court was not persuaded by plaintiffs’ argument that Providence Community
Corrections’ conduct was “capable of repetition yet evading review.” Id.
178. Id. at 772.
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into the individual’s ability to pay, that the individual has the ability to pay
such that any nonpayment is willful. The meaningful inquiry into the individual’s ability to pay includes, but is not limited to, notice, an opportunity to
present evidence, and the assistance of appointed counsel.’179

The pursuit of injunctions against private probation companies thus seems
to be an effective avenue for obtaining relief. Although an injunction was issued
in only one case, in both circumstances, the act of seeking an injunction
changed the probation company’s and the government’s policies and behaviors.
5. Challenging Conditions of Confinement
A final area in which those accused or convicted of a crime have sought
injunctive relief occurs in the context of prison conditions. Indirectly, injunctions have been successful in addressing and alleviating troubling pretrial and
postconviction conditions of confinement. In one prominent case, Timothy
Gumm and Robert Watkins sought injunctive relief after spending seven-andone-half and ten years, respectively, in solitary confinement in the Georgia Department of Corrections Special Management Unit (SMU).180 According to the
complaint, those whom the Georgia Department of Corrections (DOC) assigned to the SMU were detained in a parking-space-sized cell for an average of
twenty-three to twenty-four hours a day, unable to see out any doors or windows or have substantive interactions with others.181 Half of the people detained in the SMU were required to shower in their cells, and in the best case
scenario, recreation consisted of being alone in a slightly larger metal cage for
two sessions of two-and-a-half hours a week.182 In some cases, recreation was
prohibited altogether.183 As a consequence of SMU’s policies, “people in the
SMU [were] utterly isolated, many of them for years on end, with little if any
meaningful human interaction.”184
Due to these conditions, almost half of those detained in the SMU “had
documented mental disorders requiring treatment, and [detainees] frequently

179. Rodriguez v. Providence Cmty. Corr., Inc., No. 3:15-cv-01048, at 3–4 (M.D. Tenn. July 18, 2018)
(amended order granting final approval of class settlement and plan of allocation, granting motions for attorney’s fees, granting permanent injunction, and dismissing the case, appearing as Document 229 on the
docket). The order goes on to lay out in great detail how the enjoined parties need to act in order to be in
accord with the permanent injunction. Id. at 21–26.
180. Press Release, S. Ctr. for Human Rights, Georgia Prisoners Reach Settlement to Reform One of
the “Harshest and Most Draconian” Solitary Confinement Units in the Nation (Jan. 9, 2019),
https://www.schr.org/resources/georgia_prisoners_reach_settlement_to_reform_one_of_the_harshest_
and_most_draconian.
181. Id.; see Second Amended Complaint at 4, Gumm v. Jacobs, No. 5:15-cv-41, 2017 WL 4106240
(M.D. Ga. July 20, 2017).
182. Second Amended Complaint, supra note 181, at 4.
183. Id.
184. Id.
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resorted to extreme measures to cope with the stress of isolation, including cutting themselves, swallowing harmful objects or pills, banging their heads against
the wall, and smearing feces on their cells and bodies.”185 In 2017, two people
committed suicide.186 According to an extensive expert report, the SMU was
“one of the harshest and most draconian” facilities in the country and those
detained in the SMU were “among the most psychologically traumatized persons [the expert had] ever assessed in this context” and were at “grave risk of
harm.”187 The expert report included pages of deeply disturbing photographs
from within the SMU.188
Plaintiffs alleged violations of their Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment
rights because the DOC failed to meaningfully review confinement in the SMU,
“deprive[d] [them] of basic human needs, create[d] a substantial risk of serious
mental and physical harm, violate[d] basic standards of decency, and constitute[d] grossly disproportionate punishment.”189 Gumm alleged that while in
the SMU, he received inadequate food, causing severe weight loss and putting
him at a substantial risk of serious medical harm.190 Initially, Gumm sought
preliminary and permanent injunctions requiring the defendants to transfer him
to the general population and establish procedural safeguards and “conditions
of confinement that reasonably mitigate the substantial risk of serious harm
caused by prolonged isolation.”191 Once other plaintiffs joined his lawsuit, they
sought preliminary injunctions requiring defendants to “[o]ffer at least three
hours of daily out-of-cell time to all prisoners in the SMU” and, within thirty
days, establish a plan for providing “meaningful activities and opportunities for
social interaction” and for “evaluat[ing] all prisoners in the SMU to determine
which prisoners have mental illness and to promptly transfer such persons out
of the SMU.”192
The case ultimately settled, with a permanent injunction issuing. As part of
the settlement, the DOC agreed that all inmates would receive at least four
hours of daily out-of-cell time during the week, including access to an outdoor
recreation area; that inmates would receive access to the library and to at least
two hours a week of programming, including GED classes, if desired; that inmates housed in the SMU would receive food that is the same as the food given
to those housed elsewhere; and that, with a few exceptions, no one is to remain

185. Press Release, S. Ctr. for Human Rights, supra note 180.
186. Id.
187. Expert Report and Declaration of Professor Craig Haney, Ph.D., J.D. at 9–10, Gumm v. Jacobs,
No. 5:15-cv-41-MTT, 2017 WL 4106240 (M.D. Ga. July 10, 2018).
188. Id. at 119–68.
189. Second Amended Complaint, supra note 181, at 5.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 70–71.
192. Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 2, Gumm, No. 5:15-cv-41-MTT, 2017 WL
4106240.

1 LOLLAR 311-350 (DO NOT DELETE)

340

11/26/2019 12:35 PM

ALABAMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71:2:311

housed in the SMU longer than two years.193 The court noted that the “relief
provided in the Settlement Agreement is necessary to prevent violations of prisoners’ constitutional rights . . . and constitutes the least intrusive means of ensuring compliance with minimal constitutional requirements.”194
A recent case out of Alabama provides another illustration. A state law in
Alabama purportedly permits sheriffs to “keep and retain,” as part of their income, taxpayer dollars allocated for feeding people in jails.195 In an effort to
learn which sheriffs have interpreted the law in this way and by how much they
have profited, two nonprofit organizations—the Southern Center for Human
Rights and the Alabama Appleseed Center for Law and Justice—sent letters to
every sheriff in Alabama requesting copies of financial records that show how
much of the jail-food budget each has kept for personal use.196 Forty-nine of
sixty-seven sheriffs refused to produce the records, claiming that these documents are “personal.”197 One sheriff who responded indicated that he “took
more than $250,000 in ‘compensation’ from ‘food provisions’ in both 2016 and
2015. Another sheriff was held in contempt of a federal court in 2017 after
removing $160,000 from the jail food account and investing it in a used car
dealership.”198 A third sheriff, who was subsequently voted out of office, released tax forms showing he made a profit of $672,392 from the prisoner food
funds in 2015 and 2016.199
After not hearing back from an open-records request, the two organizations filed a state lawsuit against Alabama officials, alleging that they were appropriating funds designated for the provision of food to inmates.200 The lawsuit sought a declaratory judgment that the requested records are public, not
“personal,” and unspecified injunctive relief.201 Ultimately, the court granted

193. Final Order and Permanent Injunction, App. A at 4–8, Gumm, No. 5:15-cv-41-MTT, 2017 WL
4102640.
194. Final Order and Permanent Injunction at 7, Gumm, No. 5:15-cv-41_MTT, 2017 WL 4102640.
195. Press Release, S. Ctr. for Human Rights, Civil Rights Groups Sue 49 Alabama Sheriffs for Access
to Public Records Showing How Sheriffs Personally Profit from Funds Allocated for Feeding People in Jail
(Jan. 8, 2018), https://www.schr.org/resources/civil_rights_groups_sue_49_alabama_sheriffs_for_access_
to_public_records_showing_how.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Alabama Sheriff Kept over $600k Meant for Inmates’ Food, then He Lost Reelection, USA TODAY (Jun. 7,
2018, 9:46 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2018/06/07/alabama-sheriff-keptthousands-meant-inmates-food-lost-reelection/679929002/; Mary Papenfuss, Alabama Sheriff Pocketed $1.5
Million in ICE Funds for Immigrant Food: Report, HUFFPOST (Jan. 1, 2019, 8:05 AM), https://www.huffington
post.ca/entry/alabama-sheriff-pockets-federal-funds-immigrant-inmatefood_n_5c29a81de4b0407e908400a8.
200. S. Ctr. for Human Rights v. Ellis, No. CV-2018-900001.00 (Cir. Ct. of Hale Cty., Ala. Aug. 3,
2018) (Alacourt).
201. Complaint, Ellis (Alacourt), https://www.schr.org/files/post/files/HaleCountyAL.PDF.
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the defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings, thereby dismissing the
lawsuit.202
After the nonprofits filed the lawsuit, but prior to the dismissal of the case,
the Governor of Alabama directed the state comptroller to no longer pay jailfood money directly to the sheriffs.203 In response, one former county sheriff
sued the state comptroller, seeking a declaratory judgment to try to keep the
money, saying the Governor had no authority to change the practice.204 Subsequently, the two nonprofits, joined by other organizations, sent a letter to all
three U.S. Attorneys’ Offices in Alabama, encouraging them to investigate Alabama sheriffs with federal detention contracts who have personally profited
from the jail-food funds.205 In May 2019, the Alabama Legislature enacted restrictions on the use of money allocated to counties to provide food for jail
inmates, requiring that counties establish a “prisoner feeding fund” to safeguard
the money designated for that purpose.206 Thus, although the request for an
injunction was unavailing in this case, it triggered state officials to review the
policies affecting inmates on a daily basis.
These are only two in a long string of cases litigating conditions of confinement and pretrial and postconviction institutions.207 Equitable relief, particularly at the state level, seems like an important option for courts to consider in
this type of case or other cases challenging conditions of confinement. An injunction can prevent the parties from continuing to deny inmates the nutrition

202. Ellis, at 14 (Alacourt). The court cited three reasons for the dismissal: the lack of standing of
Alabama Appleseed Center for Law and Justice, id. at 4–9; the ripeness of the claim, id. at 9–10; and abatement
of the claim due to a pending lawsuit against the Southern Center for Human Rights filed by one of the
named defendants addressing these same issues, id. at 10–13.
203. Jalea Brooks, Alabama Will No Longer Give Jail Food Funds to “Sheriff’s [sic] Personally,” ALA. NEWS
NETWORK (Jul. 11, 2018, 6:54 PM), https://www.alabamanews.net/2018/07/11/alabama-will-no-longergive-jail-food-funds-to-sheriffs-personally/.
204. Joel Porter, Former Marshall County Sheriff Sues to Keep Jail Food Money, WHNT NEWS 19 (Feb. 1,
2019, 10:46 PM), https://whnt.com/2019/02/01/former-marshall-county-sheriff-claims-jail-food-fundingshould-be-his/.
205. Press Release, S. Ctr. for Human Rights, Groups Call for Investigation into Potential Violations
of Federal Law by Alabama Sheriffs with Federal Detention Contracts Who Convert Jail Food Funds to
Personal Use (Oct. 17, 2018), https://www.schr.org/resources/groups_call_for_investigation_into_
potential_violations_of_federal_law_by_alabama_sheriffs. Numerous counties house federal detainees in
county jails based on contracts with the U.S. Marshals Service and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement. Id. The nonprofits cite a specific example of a sheriff profiting far more than he received from state
and municipal sources combined, suggesting that the funds he pocketed must have been federal. Id.
206. Mike Cason, Alabama Lawmakers Pass Bill to Protect Jail Food Funds, AL.COM (May 2, 2019),
https://www.al.com/news/2019/05/alabama-lawmakers-pass-bill-to-protect-jail-food-funds.html.
207. See, e.g., Agreement Settles Lawsuit Challenging Overcrowded and Dangerous Conditions at Donaldson Correctional Facility, S. CTR. FOR HUM. RTS. (Apr. 21, 2011), https://www.schr.org/action/resources/agreement_
settles_lawsuit_challenging_overcrowded_and_dangerous_conditions_at_donal; Derek Gilna, California Jail
Settles Class-Action Lawsuit Over Conditions of Confinement, PRISON LEGAL NEWS (Apr. 2, 2019),
https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/news/2019/apr/2/california-jail-settles-class-action-lawsuit-overconditions-confinement/; Healthcare, S. CTR. FOR HUM. RTS., https://www.schr.org/our-work/prisons-jails/
healthcare (last visited Oct. 17, 2019).
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and sustenance they need, or it can ensure that jails and prisons provide adequate medical care, as just two prominent examples. Often, these cases are resolved through the issuance of injunctions—preliminary, permanent, or both—
sometimes after settlement and other times as a result of a judge’s order or a
trial verdict.
* * *
Injunctions aim to prevent harm on the front end—to stop a party from
acting in a manner that causes a particular harm. The other two equitable remedies discussed are aimed at establishing a particular right or recovering an existing right. For example, a court may order specific performance of a plea
agreement after the government breaches it or when defense counsel provides
ineffective assistance of counsel to a defendant in the context of that plea agreement.
B. Specific Performance of Plea Offers and Plea Bargains
Much of the appellate litigation occurring in criminal cases involves appeals
from some aspect of the plea-bargaining process. After all, 97% of federal convictions and 94% of state felony convictions are the result of guilty pleas.208
Santobello v. New York was the first significant case in which the Supreme Court
invoked equity, specifically the doctrine of specific performance, to resolve an
issue with the plea process.209 Since that time, both federal and state courts have
continued to rely on specific performance as an effective remedy for wrongs
incurred during the plea process.
Rudolph Santobello was indicted on two gambling-related charges. After
entering an initial plea of not guilty, his attorney worked out a deal with the
prosecutor wherein Santobello would agree to plead guilty to a lesser-included
offense that carried a maximum sentence of one year of incarceration.210 In
return, the government attorney “agreed to make no recommendation as to the
sentence.”211 Consistent with this agreement, Santobello entered a guilty plea,
and the court set a date for sentencing.212 A number of delays occurred, and
after about seven months, Santobello had his sentencing hearing with new
counsel, a new prosecutor, and in front of a new judge.213 The new prosecutor

208. See UNIVERSITY AT ALBANY, HINDELANG CRIMINAL JUSTICE RESEARCH CTR., SOURCEBOOK
CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS, tbl. 5.22.2009, http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t5222009.pdf
(last visited Oct. 20, 2019); id. at tbl. 5.46.2006, https://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t5462006.pdf (last
visited Oct. 20, 2019).
209. 404 U.S. 257 (1971).
210. Id. at 258.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 258–59.
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requested a one-year sentence over defense counsel’s objection, in light of the
initial prosecutor’s promise not to make a sentencing recommendation.214 Defense counsel asked to adjourn the proceeding to get proof of the first prosecutor’s promise, as the new prosecutor claimed there was nothing in the record
to indicate such a promise had been made.215 Assuring defense counsel that he
was “not at all influenced by what the District Attorney [said],” the judge proceeded to sentence Santobello to the maximum sentence of one year.216 Santobello appealed, and the Government conceded on appeal that the initial prosecutor had promised to make no recommendation at sentencing.217
Finding that “[d]isposition of charges after plea discussions is not only an
essential part of the process but a highly desirable part for many reasons,”218
the Supreme Court found “[t]his phase of the process of criminal justice, and
the adjudicative element inherent in accepting a plea of guilty, must be attended
by safeguards to insure the defendant what is reasonably due in the circumstances.”219 Although the individual circumstances in any given case might vary,
“a constant factor is that when a plea rests in any significant degree on a promise
or agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of the inducement or consideration, such promise must be fulfilled.”220 Despite the fact that
the second prosecutor only “inadvertently” breached the agreement made with
Santobello and notwithstanding the judge’s comment that he was not influenced by the prosecutor’s sentencing argument, “the interests of justice and
appropriate recognition of the duties of the prosecution in relation to promises
made in the negotiation of pleas of guilty will be best served by remanding the
case to the state courts for further consideration.”221
The remedy for this breach, of course, is the critical issue. The Court contemplated two potential remedies on remand: specific performance of the plea
agreement in front of a different sentencing judge or the opportunity for Santobello to withdraw his guilty plea, as he was requesting.222 On remand, the
lower court required specific performance, finding Santobello’s plea had been
entered into voluntarily by a defendant “not inexperienced in criminal proceedings,” with the assistance of the counsel of his choice.223 The sole dissenting
justice thought the State should have the option of reprosecuting the initial
charges.224
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.

Id. at 259.
Id.
Id. at 259–60.
Id. at 262.
Id. at 261.
Id. at 262.
Id.
Id. at 262–63.
Id.
People v. Santobello, 39 A.D.2d 654, 655 (N.Y. App. Div. 1972).
Id. at 656 (Steuer, J., dissenting).
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The Ninth Circuit has reinforced Santobello’s holding and the appropriateness of the specific performance remedy in the case of government breach. In
the context of a plea agreement where the Government agreed to recommend
a certain sentence or sentencing range at the time the plea was entered but then
subsequently breached that aspect of the plea agreement, the court said the following: if the defendant “timely moves for specific performance, the district
court must grant the motion, order the government to fulfill its obligations under the agreement, and immediately transfer the case to a different district judge
to ensure that the decision to accept or reject the agreement will be untainted
by the breach.”225 If the district court fails to grant the defense’s motion for
specific performance and rejects the agreement that the parties reached, “it
commits an error of law and thereby abuses its discretion.”226
The Supreme Court contemplated the remedy of specific performance in
another significant plea-bargaining case more than forty years after Santobello,
Lafler v. Cooper.227 This time, rather than an allegation of government breach, the
issue before the Court involved the proper remedy when constitutionally ineffective counsel prejudiced the defendant by encouraging a trial rather than communicating the substantially more appealing plea offer.228 Sometimes this scenario arises when the plea offer allows for a guilty plea to a lesser charge; other
times it arises when the plea is to a lesser sentence or to a charge that does not
carry a mandatory minimum sentence. Although the Court contemplated specific performance as a remedy, the Court was less convinced that specific performance was the sole or most appropriate remedy.229
Blaine Lafler was charged with assault with intent to murder and several
other firearm-related charges, in addition to a misdemeanor marijuana charge.230
The Michigan prosecutor twice offered to dismiss two charges and recommend
a sentence of fifty-one to eighty-five months, in exchange for Lafler’s plea to
the other two charges.231 Despite expressing a willingness to accept the offer,
Lafler ultimately rejected it, purportedly at the recommendation of counsel,
who told Lafler he could not be convicted of assault with intent to murder
because he shot the complainant below the waist.232 Lafler went to trial, was
convicted, and received a mandatory-minimum sentence of 185 to 360 months
in prison—more than three times the initial offer.233

225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.

United States v. Heredia, 768 F.3d 1220, 1236 (9th Cir. 2014).
Id.
566 U.S. 156 (2012).
Id. at 160.
Id. at 174.
Id. at 161.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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On appeal, Lafler claimed ineffective assistance of counsel. The state appellate courts rejected his argument, but the federal district court granted an
initial writ of habeas corpus, finding the lower courts “had unreasonably applied
the [test] for [in]effective assistance of counsel [from] Strickland v. Washington.”234 The district court ordered “specific performance of [respondent’s] original plea agreement” as the remedy.235 Having earlier that day found the “Sixth
Amendment right to counsel . . . extends to the plea-bargaining process,”236 the
Supreme Court agreed that the lower courts erred in how they applied Strickland
in the context presented by Lafler, but the Court was not convinced that the
district court’s remedy was the right one.
Reiterating that the remedy “must ‘neutralize the taint’ of [the] constitutional violation,” the Court noted that “Sixth Amendment remedies [likewise]
should be ‘tailored to the injury suffered from the constitutional violation and
should not unnecessarily infringe on competing interests.’”237 The remedy cannot “grant a windfall to the defendant or needlessly squander the considerable
resources the State properly invested in the criminal prosecution.”238 Here, the
Court observed that “[t]he specific injury suffered by defendants who decline a
plea offer as a result of ineffective assistance of counsel and then receive a
greater sentence as a result of trial can come in at least one of two forms”239: a
lesser sentence under the plea than they got at trial or a conviction for a lesser
offense than the charge of conviction received at trial—which sometimes might
involve the imposition of a mandatory minimum sentence.240 If the constitutional injury was a greater sentence, the Court suggested that the lower court
conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the defendant has shown
a reasonable probability that but for counsel’s errors he would have accepted
the plea. If the showing is made, the court may exercise discretion in determining whether the defendant should receive the term of imprisonment the
government offered in the plea, the sentence he received at trial, or something
in between.241

In the second scenario, that of a conviction for a greater charge or a charge
carrying a mandatory minimum, the Court indicated that reoffering the initial

234. Id. at 162; see also Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Strickland established a two-part
test for determining whether defense counsel is ineffective in a criminal case: the defendant must show, first,
“that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness” (the “performance” prong)
and, second, that but for counsel’s errors, there is a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding
would have been different. Id. at 688, 694.
235. Lafler, 566 U.S. at 162 (quoting Cooper v. Lafler, No. 06–11068, 2009 WL 817712, at *9 (E.D.
Mich. Mar. 26, 2009)).
236. Id. (citing Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 142–44 (2012)).
237. Id. at 170 (quoting United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361, 364 (1981)).
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 170–71.
241. Id. at 171.
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plea might well be the most appropriate remedy.242 Essentially, in either scenario, the remedy is simply left to the trial judge. Specific performance might
be appropriate, or it might not.
On the facts of Lafler, the Court held that the district court’s specific-performance remedy was not the appropriate one.243 Rather, the state should be
required to reoffer the initial plea bargain, and then, if the defendant accepts it,
the state trial court could “exercise its discretion” and decide “whether to vacate
the convictions and resentence respondent pursuant to the plea agreement, to
vacate only some of the convictions and resentence respondent accordingly, or
to leave the convictions and sentence from trial undisturbed.”244
Subsequent to Lafler, several lower courts—both state and federal—have
ordered specific performance of the initial plea offer,245 although a few others
have rejected the remedy.246 In most cases, courts never reach the issue of remedy, as they reject the claim of ineffective assistance or find that procedural
hurdles bar consideration of the claim.
C. Restitution
Restitution is one of the few equity-based remedies to appear regularly in
criminal court proceedings. Restitution traditionally has been defined as a remedy intended to rectify one party’s unjust enrichment at another party’s expense
by requiring the erring party to disgorge her unlawful gain.247 The “restitution”
remedy used with regularity in criminal sentencing proceedings, however, is often distinct from this familiar principle. Criminal courts now employ what many
call “criminal restitution” but what is more aptly termed “punitive compensation,”248 a remedy intended to “make [a] victim ‘whole’” by requiring a criminal
defendant to compensate the victim for financial, physical, and emotional
losses.249 Resembling civil damages, punitive compensation does not involve
the disgorgement of unlawful gain, but rather it involves payments to a victim
as reimbursement of losses and compensation for intangible harms. Although
restitution in its traditional sense—the disgorgement of unjust enrichment—
242. Id.
243. Id. at 174.
244. Id.
245. See, e.g., United States v. Brunsman, No. 1:11-cr-014-SJD-MRM, 2016 WL 2998110, at *8–9 (S.D.
Ohio May 25, 2016); United States v. Merlino, 109 F. Supp. 3d 368, 377 (D. Mass. 2015); Soto-Lopez v.
United States, No. 07-cr-3475-IEG, 2012 WL 3134253, at *8 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 1, 2012)); State v. Lopez, 872
N.W.2d 159, 181 (Iowa 2015); McAmis v. State, 317 P.3d 49, 53 (Idaho Ct. App. 2013); State v. Dennis, No.
A-1843-11T2, 2013 WL 2459864, at *3–4 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. June 10, 2013).
246. Rodriguez v. State, 470 S.W.3d 823, 831 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015); cf. State v. Estrada, No. A-207814T3, 2018 WL 2925776, at *12–13 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. June 12, 2018).
247. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW (THIRD) RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 1, cmts. a, b
(AM. LAW INST. 2011).
248. See Cortney E. Lollar, Punitive Compensation, 51 TULSA L. REV. 99, 100 (2015).
249. Id.; Lollar, supra note 12.
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does sometimes play a role in criminal cases, particularly cases involving theft,
fraud, or embezzlement, punitive compensation is also frequently imposed. In
fact, most state and federal “restitution” statutes are compensation statutes, not
disgorgement statutes.250 However, both punitive compensation and traditional
restitution fall under the auspices of what most call “criminal restitution.”
Although restitution began as an equitable remedy, at this point, all but the
most immersed scholars have difficulty parsing out whether restitution is a legal
remedy, an equitable remedy, or some combination thereof.251 According to the
Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment, “[t]he status of restitution as belonging to law or to equity has been ambiguous from the outset.
The answer is that restitution may be either or both.”252 This ambiguity is due
to the fact that restitution “acquired its modern contours as the result of an
explicit amalgamation of rights and remedies drawn from both systems,” law
and equity.253 As a rule of thumb, the Restatement reporters suggest that “[i]f
restitution to the claimant is accomplished exclusively by a judgment for money,
without resort to any of the ancillary . . . devices traditionally available in equity
but not at law,” such as constructive trusts or subrogation, “the remedy is presumptively legal.”254
When restitution is imposed in criminal cases, it is almost always imposed
as a judgment for money, without resort to “ancillary . . . devices traditionally
available in equity.”255 Rarely is a defendant ordered to return a stolen watch,
for example, as most of the time the appropriated item is long gone. As a result,
in most criminal cases, restitution operates as a legal, rather than an equitable,
device. For another critical reason, in most cases, restitution can only be a legal,
not an equitable, remedy: the equitable remedy of restitution only contemplated
disgorgement of a person’s unlawful gain, not the broader conception of reim-

250. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3664(f)(1)(A) (2015) (“In each order of restitution, the court shall order restitution to each victim in the full amount of each victim’s losses as determined by the court . . . .”); id.
§ 3663A(b)(2)–(4) (requiring a court to order a defendant to reimburse the victim for medical, psychiatric,
and psychological treatment; physical and occupational therapy; lost income; child care costs; and other expenses stemming from the offense itself and the investigation and prosecution of the offense); id.
§ 3663(b)(2)–(6); id. § 2259 (b)(1)–(2) (Supp. 2019) (requiring a court to order defendant to pay the “full
amount of the victim’s losses”).
251. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW (THIRD) RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 4(1).
252. Id. § 4 cmt. a. According to the Restatement reporters, this question would be merely of historical
interest “were it not for two peculiarities of American law.” Id. The first relates to the Seventh Amendment
jury-trial right, a right not generally applicable in the criminal context. Id. The second occurs when a federal
statute provides that the rights authorized by that statute “may be judicially enforced via ‘equitable relief.’”
Id. With regard to both “peculiarities,” “[r]esolution of such problems turns on issues of constitutional and
statutory interpretation that are beyond the reach of legal history and outside the scope of this Restatement.”
Id.
253. Id. § 4 cmt. b.
254. See id. § 4 cmt. d. If the money does not need to be traced or is not coming from a particular
source, legal restitution is appropriate. Id; Rendleman, supra note 67, at 1433.
255. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW (THIRD) RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 4 cmt. d.
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bursement for victim losses that the vast majority of criminal “restitution” statutes currently contemplate. Criminal restitution statutes confirm this legal
grounding, with numerous statutes allowing for, or requiring, compensation for
losses to be imposed in a range of criminal cases.256 Allusions to equitable principles are markedly absent.
Although much can be written about restitution,257 most of the current issues related to restitution involve its operation as a legal mechanism rather than
an equitable one.258
III. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF COURTS’ ENGAGEMENT
WITH EQUITABLE REMEDIES
The circumstances in which parties and courts have invoked equitable remedies give testament to the remaining need for these remedies. In various scenarios—from financial obligation relief to prosecutorial abuse of witnesses,
from untenable practices of prison officials to ineffective lawyering by defense
counsel—parties and crime victims have sought equitable relief from some disquieting aspects of the criminal legal process. These remedies do not always
inure to a criminal defendant’s benefit, but most of the time, they provide important relief to people charged with or convicted of crimes. When taken as a
whole, these equitable avenues for relief afford a necessary complement to the
legal remedies currently available in criminal cases.
In light of the range of troubling issues resolved via equity, the importance
of equitable remedies appears undeniable, not only for the critical role they once
served but also for the role they continue to serve in balancing out the legal
rules and procedures that are the backbone of our legal system. Harkening back
to Martha Nussbaum’s observations, we are reminded that, although “[t]he
point of the rule of law is to bring us as close as possible to what equity would
discern in a variety of cases, . . . no such rules can be precise or sensitive enough,
and when they have manifestly erred, it is justice itself . . . to use equity’s flexible
standard.”259
The equity to which Nussbaum refers is broader than the bounded notion
of equity with which courts currently engage. Even within narrowly conscripted
bounds, however, employing equity in the criminal context can and does allow
relief, both in individual cases and on a more systemic level, as the illustrations
throughout this Article show. Equitable remedies are a viable method for chal-

256. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1593 (2015 & Supp. 2019); id. § 2248 (2015); id. § 2259 (2015 & Supp. 2019);
id. §§ 3663, 3663A, 3664 (2015).
257. For those interested in a more in-depth discussion of criminal restitution, two of my previous
articles discuss the subject in depth. See, e.g., Lollar, supra note 12; Lollar, supra note 248.
258. Id.
259. Nussbaum, supra note 18, at 96.
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lenging the increasing, troubling use of legal financial obligations and unnecessarily punitive bail practices. They provide an avenue for taking on the more
unscrupulous practices of private probation companies and prison officials.
They allow for relief from a criminal conviction when evidence of ineffective
assistance of counsel in plea negotiations only comes to light after a person has
been sentenced. These are but a few of the situations in which an equitable
remedy has provided relief.
The need for equity to continue as a counterpart to law, for equitable remedies to remain a part of our legal system, is particularly pressing after a halfcentury or more of increasingly punitive impulses. Equitable remedies can play
a crucial role in beginning to balance out the substantive law’s overinclusivity,
the narrowing of procedural protections for criminal defendants, and the staggering expansion of criminal sentences, both in the form of length of sentence
and monetary sanctions imposed. Yet in light of equity’s current inability to
directly challenge any aspect of the investigation or prosecution of a criminal
case, equitable remedies cannot address some of the most pervasive and troubling aspects of the criminal process. At this point, equity simply does not have
authorization to reach the more significant inequities in the system.
But the growing litigation around equitable remedies in criminal cases and
the greater prevalence of judges at the state and federal levels who are willing
to consider, analyze, and sometimes even grant equitable relief is a start in the
right direction. As this Article shows, even when cases settle, the request for an
equitable remedy often leads to the positive resolution of the case from the
perspective of fairness and justice.
This Article also raises the question of what role equity can and should play
in the resolution of criminal cases. Equity came into being to refine and balance
out the rule of law, but it became too unbounded, too subject to the “carelessness, bias, and arbitrariness endemic to any totally discretionary” system.260 Arguably, the pendulum has swung too far in the other direction. In the context
of criminal cases, the current legal system errs on the side of rigidity and inflexibility. Perhaps there is an expanded role for equity in this new criminal legal
reality.
Equity, as it is narrowly conceived, provides only a limited avenue for
judges to circumvent many statutory and extralegal constraints. But the potential is there. One can envision equity providing a much needed counterbalance
desired by both advocates and scholars alike. This is not a call for a system
wholly grounded in equity. Allowing judges unbridled discretion to make rulings based on their own personal view of what is “equitable” and free of standards, predictability, and structure is likely to result in an undesirable system subject to “arbitrariness and corruption,” and dependent “upon constitution,

260. Id. at 96.
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temper, and passion.”261 A more balanced system, with a bounded form of equity that is truly able to serve as a counterweight and corrective to law, can be
achieved.262 The next step is to ascertain how best to adjust the current balance
between law and equity in order to reach equipoise. This Article aims to be the
starting point for that conversation.
CONCLUSION
[E]quitable jurisdiction exists and will be exercised in all cases, and under all
circumstances, where the remedy at law is not adequate, complete, and certain,
so as to meet all the requirements of justice. That there is a legal remedy is not
enough; such remedy . . . must be in all respects as satisfactory as the relief
furnished by a court of equity.263

Although these words were written by John Pomeroy more than a century
ago, they remain important guiding principles for today’s criminal jurisprudence. If the legal remedy is insufficient, courts must look to equity to fill the
gaps, to act as a corrective to the inequities presented by the legal system. Courts
have started to make this move in criminal cases. This Article takes note of
numerous instances in which courts have engaged with criminal equity, granting
remedial relief in a criminal case or group of cases, and hopes to encourage a
richer and more substantive discussion of how courts might further engage with
equity to help right the current imbalances in the criminal legal system.

261. Rendleman, supra note 67, at 1400–01 (quoting JAMES OLDHAM, THE MANSFIELD MANUSCRIPTS
AND THE GROWTH OF ENGLISH LAW IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 1356 (1992)).
262. See SAMET, supra note 6, for one potential method of employing equity more broadly but with
clear boundaries.
263. JOHN NORTON POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 297 (Students’ ed. 1907).

